Morning Sessions

Read a transcript of Dr. Ratner’s keynote remarks.

10:10 am – 10:30 am: Break

11:40 am - 11:55 am: Break

Afternoon Sessions

Read a transcript of the debate.

2:40 pm - 3:00 pm: Break

The post China’s Power: Up for Debate 2023 appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

Quantum Technologies Explained

Quantum technologies are a loose set of nascent technologies that harness the principles of quantum mechanics to enable revolutionary breakthroughs across various fields. Quantum technologies can be grouped into three main areas—sensing, communication, and computing.

• Quantum Sensing: In the field of quantum sensing, researchers are pushing to develop ultra-sensitive devices capable of measuring minute changes in motion and electromagnetic fields. As these technologies advance, they could lend unprecedented levels of precision to medical imaging and diagnosis, navigation, radar, geophysics, and more.

• Quantum Communication: Quantum communication promises to enable ultra-fast and highly secure data transmissions. With conventional electronics, data is typically encrypted and then sent as bits representing 1s and 0s. However, quantum bits—or qubits—can be transmitted in a state of superposition in which they can represent combinations of 1 and 0 simultaneously. This allows for virtually un-hackable communications—a highly sought after capability for governments, militaries, financial firms, and others.  

• Quantum Computing: The third area of quantum technologies—quantum computing—has garnered the most attention globally and promises to be the most transformative of the three. Like quantum communication devices, quantum computers exploit the properties of superposition, which enables many calculations simultaneously. Theoretically, quantum computers equipped with enough qubits can perform complex calculations at speeds exponentially faster than even the most advanced supercomputers in use today.  

While quantum technologies are immensely promising, many of the more advanced capabilities still remain largely confined to research and development work. Most quantum devices require complex and precise engineering in order to work. Some quantum computers, for example, must be chilled to extremely low temperatures to avoid disturbances and information loss.¹ As a result of these limitations, certain quantum technologies face major obstacles to commercialization and are unlikely to see widescale adoption for years or even decades.

China’s Quantum Ambitions

Despite the nascent status of quantum technologies, their potentially revolutionary qualities have caught the attention of Chinese policymakers. In 2021, the Chinese government enshrined quantum technology into its latest national economic blueprint, the 14th Five Year Plan, listing it along with six other cutting-edge fields that should be prioritized in the coming years.²    

China’s focus on quantum technologies is part of a broader push for global technological leadership that has intensified under Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Xi has repeatedly called for transforming China into a global “science and technology power” (科技强国). Beijing’s technology ambitions have taken on new urgency amid growing U.S.-China tension over strategic technologies. In March 2023, during a key annual political gathering in Beijing, Xi stressed that China needs to focus on scientific and technological “self-reliance and self-strengthening” in the face of “fierce international competition.”  

Toward this end, China is investing heavily in scaling up research and development (R&D). Chinese spending on R&D has more than doubled since Xi came to power in 2012. This is not merely a byproduct of economic growth, but also higher prioritization. In 2012, Chinese R&D spending amounted to 1.91 percent of its GDP, and by 2022 that figure had climbed to 2.55 percent of GDP. 

However, China’s interests in quantum go well beyond abstract notions of global leadership. Policymakers hope that quantum technologies will have tangible economic and security benefits.  

Quantum computing, for example, could have force-multiplying impacts on Beijing’s other key focus areas, like artificial intelligence. In a seminal 2017 report, the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” the Chinese government laid out hopes that quantum computing could advance AI capabilities by enhancing the performance of machine learning algorithms.  

There are also hopes that advanced quantum computers could revolutionize scientists’ ability to model complex systems to achieve breakthroughs in areas like materials sciences and biomedicine. If these capabilities materialize, they could have transformative effects and reap enormous economic dividends.  

Chinese scientists and strategists are also well aware that quantum technologies have major security and military applications. The 13^th Five Year Special Plan for Science and Technology Military-Civil Fusion Development, issued in 2017, includes quantum communication and computing among a list of priority strategic technologies. More pointedly, a researcher at China's Academy of Military Sciences described quantum technologies as a “bolting dark horse” that is “poised to change the mechanisms of future military victories.” 

A key area of concern is encryption. Armed with unparalleled computing power, an advanced quantum computer could break through existing conventional encryption methods that are used by individuals, banks, internet companies, governments, and militaries to secure data. Some experts worry that such a “Q-Day” scenario is not far away and could bring unprecedented challenges.  

Chinese researchers claim to have already developed an algorithm that can be run on a small quantum computer that can decipher an advanced encryption system commonly used by governments and financial institutions. However, scientists outside of China have viewed these claims with deep skepticism.  

“Quantum, as a 'bolting dark horse,' has made a significant impact on the information age… and is poised to change the mechanisms of future military victories."

Col. Gao Dongguang, Researcher, PLA Academy of Military Sciences

In the United States, the Biden administration has taken moves to prepare for quantum’s potential threats to data security and to shore up the country’s own quantum capabilities. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology identified four new encryption algorithms to be integrated into the department’s security standards that should be resilient to potential hacking from quantum computers.

Other quantum technologies could have additional applications in the military domain. Quantum sensing can potentially improve lidar and radar for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and also provide positioning and navigational capabilities in the absence of satellite-based systems. Such capabilities remain in development, but China is making progress. Chinese researchers are reportedly developing a quantum radar device that could improve the Chinese military’s ability to detect stealth aircraft.  

China is not alone in pursuing quantum technologies for military and security ends. Both the U.S. Navy and Air Force have created quantum research centers, with the goal of building quantum-equipped forces capable of faster threat detection and response. Although mature quantum technology is not yet ready for major military integration, NATO has already identified quantum as one of its key emerging and disruptive technologies. 

China’s State-Led Approach 

China has taken a characteristic state-led approach to funding and conducting R&D of quantum technologies. This stands in stark contrast to the approach taken by the United States and other leading quantum technology players, where the private sector has typically led.  

The Chinese government has invested impressive amounts into developing quantum technologies. Exact figures are not available, but existing studies suggest China leads by a wide margin in government spending. McKinsey estimates that as of 2022, the Chinese government has announced a total of $15.3 billion in funding, which is almost double that of the European Union ($8.4 billion) and more than triple that of the United States ($3.7 billion). However, these figures are not uniformly accepted. Studies by Quantum Insider have put the range of Chinese government investment between $4 billion and $17 billion.  

Conversely, China lags in private sector investment. According to McKinsey’s estimates, between 2001 and 2022, Chinese quantum startups received only $482 million from the private sector. That is a fraction of private sector investment in the United States, which led the world with an estimated $3.3 billion from non-government sources. Even Canada and the United Kingdom were well ahead of China, with both at roughly $1.1 billion of investment.  

Unsurprisingly, state-linked institutions drive much of China’s quantum R&D. The National University of Defense Technology has been an important player, conducting research on quantum communication technology since the 1990s. In 2001, China established the Key Laboratory of Quantum Information at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), which serves as the country’s most important institution dedicated to the quantum field.

However, these trends are not set in stone. As the United States has geared up for competition with China in areas of key technology, government-led initiatives and funding to promote R&D for quantum have grown. In 2018, Congress passed the National Quantum Initiative Act to “accelerate quantum research and development for the economic and national security of the United States.” Since 2019, the U.S. federal budget on quantum for various national laboratories and universities has more than doubled, from over $400 million in 2019 to an estimated $900 million in 2022.  

Other economies are stepping up investments as well. In 2018, the European Union initiated the Quantum Flagship, which will pump some €1 billion into quantum research over the next decade. It also aims to build up a network of 5,000 quantum-related researchers across the EU. Similarly, in 2023, Canada launched the National Quantum Strategy for government investment in quantum research ($141 million), talent ($45 million), and commercialization ($169 million). The Japanese government developed its Quantum Technology and Innovation Strategy in 2020, which created eight new R&D centers. Japan followed this up in 2022 with its Vision of Quantum Future Society strategy, which aims to leverage quantum technologies to strengthen the country’s economic and societal resilience.  

Evaluating China’s Quantum Progress 

China has made impressive advances in quantum technologies in recent years. While China has not particularly distinguished itself in quantum sensing, it is widely viewed as the global leader in quantum communication. When it comes to quantum computing, China is behind the United States—the global leader—in some aspects, but its scientists have made eye-catching achievements and are progressing rapidly.  

In recent years, China has not publicly demonstrated world-leading breakthroughs in quantum sensing. There has been some reporting suggesting China is working on quantum sensors for submarine detection, and in 2021, researchers at the prestigious Tsinghua University claimed they made advances in a quantum radar that could detect stealth aircraft by generating a small “electromagnetic storm.” In 2022, a research group at USTC published findings showing that they used diamonds to improve the capabilities of a developmental quantum radar.

Although Chinese researchers have published notable research on quantum sensing, especially on quantum radar, these findings (which have been questioned) appear largely constrained to laboratories. Pan Jianwei—sometimes hailed as China’s “father of quantum”—wrote in 2020 that China “started late” in the field and was working to close the gaps.

“[China] started late in the field of quantum precision measurement, and there is a certain gap compared with developed countries as a whole, but in recent years, the gap has been rapidly narrowed, and in some directions it is equivalent to the highest international level publicly reported.”

Pan Jianwei, Executive Vice President, University of Science and Technology of China

In comparison, Chinese quantum researchers have achieved several high-profile successes in the field of quantum communication. In 2016, China made a historic breakthrough with the successful launch of Micius, the world’s first quantum-enabled satellite. Developed by Pan Jianwei and a team of scientists at USTC, Micius made groundbreaking strides toward an un-hackable satellite-based communication system. Chinese researchers are reportedly developing a constellation of quantum-enabled satellites.  

In another major quantum communication breakthrough, a team of researchers also led by Pan Jianwei developed a 2,000 kilometer quantum-secured communication link connecting Beijing and Shanghai. This was later expanded to become an integrated quantum network of four quantum metropolitan-area networks and two ground-satellite links.  

China has also pushed to become a leader in quantum computing. In 2021, China became the third country—after Canada and the United States—to develop a complete domestically-built quantum computer. The device was created by Origin Computing, a powerful driver of China’s quantum successes. 

Since then, China has developed new quantum computers and processors. In May 2023, China’s 176-qubit processor, Zuchongzhi, went online, making it China’s quantum processor with the largest number of qubits. Developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Zuchongzhi is already capable of processing tasks millions of times faster than a traditional supercomputer can. However, this still lags behind the world’s fastest processor, IBM’s 433-qubit processor which was revealed in 2022.  

Despite the already high number of qubits in these processors, quantum computers will likely require thousands of qubits to perform tasks at the complexity and caliber that scientists are looking to reach. IBM aims to debut a quantum computer with 1,121 qubits in 2023 and a quantum computer with more than 4,000 qubits by 2025.

Patents are a key measure of a country's innovation. Explore our feature to learn about trends in China's patent applications.

Explore More.

While these feats are impressive, they do not allow for a comprehensive comparison across countries. Patents, however, serve as one useful indicator of which countries or firms are leading in certain areas.  

According to one study, the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) received 1,554 applications for quantum communication patents between 2010 and 2022. This is nearly twice the number of applications to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and four times the number of applications to Japan’s patent office.  

A different picture emerges when looking at applications for quantum computing. CNIPA received just over 900 quantum computing patent applications from 2010 to 2022—less than half as many applications to the USPTO. Still, China’s office received twice as many quantum computing applications as Japan’s and far more than other patent offices.³

Yet fully understanding the state of play requires looking at certain kinds of patents. International patents—those filed in patent offices across multiple countries—are harder to acquire, and they are typically reserved for more high-quality and high-value patents. When it comes to these international patent families, Chinese companies lag.  

According to a 2023 study by the European Patent Office, only one Chinese company, Alibaba, ranked among the top-20 entities in terms of international patents in quantum computing. By comparison, U.S. companies and universities took up half of the top-20 list, with IBM taking the top spot with 401 international patent families. Japan had an impressive five companies in the top-20, with Toshiba/Nuflare Technologies taking the number-two spot.  

Even patents do not tell the whole story. Some analysts have criticized China’s large number of patent filings as an inaccurate representation of the country’s true output, arguing that Chinese patent figures are inflated by the filing of patents with marginal technological differences from existing patents.  

An alternative metric for comparing countries is the publication of research papers. China has published the largest volume of academic papers across all three areas of quantum technology. Between 2011 and 2020, China published more than 14,000 publications on quantum technology. While quantity is important, it is also crucial to assess the quality of publications. The Hirsch Index (H-index) is often used to help with this. It measures both the total number of research papers published by an entity and the number of citations the research receives. 

Between 2018 and 2022, China ranked first globally in the field of quantum communication, with an H-index score of 48.⁴ The United States followed closely behind with an H-index of 43. However, China falls slightly behind in quantum sensing research and further behind in quantum computing research. The United States was ranked the highest in quantum computing with an H-index of 91, nearly double China’s H-index of 52. 

Overall, China’s quantum capabilities have been steadily developing, yet China’s future progress will not be without challenges. The Biden administration has taken several moves to limit China’s development of certain technologies that are deemed a threat to U.S. national security. In October 2022, the United States imposed on China a suite of landmark export controls on advanced semiconductors and chip-making equipment, and Washington has successfully pushed for key allies—namely Japan and the Netherlands—to join in restricting China’s access to key chip technologies. 

Quantum technologies have emerged as another key front in intensifying U.S.-China technological competition. In 2021, the U.S. Department of Commerce placed three Chinese companies specializing in quantum technology on the Department’s Entity List, restricting exports to these firms. More recently, in August 2023, the Biden administration announced new restrictions on U.S. investments into China related to quantum technologies (as well as semiconductors and artificial intelligence). Once in effect, the rules are poised to prohibit U.S. persons from investing in all three areas of quantum technologies in China. The most painful impact of these restrictions may not be financial, but may instead result from limiting the transfer of knowledge and expertise into China.  

Authors:
Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Yu-jie (Grace) Liao, Matthew Slade

The post Is China a Leader in Quantum Technologies? appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

The Fujian is currently being fitted out at Shanghai’s Jiangnan Shipyard and is expected to undergo multiple rounds of sea trials in the coming months. These trials will ensure its readiness before it is commissioned into the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

Key Facts

• The Fujian will feature a “catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery” (CATOBAR) launch system that will enable it to launch heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft. China’s first two aircraft carriers rely on less advanced ski jump-style “short take-off, barrier-arrested recovery” (STOBAR) systems. 
• The Fujian’s catapults will be powered by an electromagnetic system similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford-class carriers. This represents a leapfrogging past more conventional steam-powered catapults. 
• The Fujian is larger than its predecessors, which will enable it to support a more robust airwing. It displaces roughly 80,000 tonnes, compared to the Liaoning’s 60,000 tonnes and the Shandong’s 66,000. The Fujian is also considerably larger than France’s Charles de Gaulle carrier (42,000 tonnes) and the United Kingdom’s HMS Queen Elizabeth (65,000 tonnes), but smaller than the U.S. Navy’s Ford-class carrier (100,000 tonnes). 
• While the Fujian will be more advanced than its Chinese predecessors, it will still be conventionally powered rather than nuclear-powered. Meanwhile, all U.S. carriers and France’s Charles de Gaulle are nuclear-powered.

How the Fujian Stacks Up

The table below provides a breakdown of some of the key characteristics of each of China's aircraft carriers. To lean more, explore these ChinaPower pages on the Liaoning and Shandong.

The post How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier? appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

This ChinaPower series closely examines developments surrounding the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis of 2022–2023. Below, you can preview some of the highlights of each feature in the series and navigate to the full features by following the links.

Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis

When then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, China responded with unprecedented military activities and strong punitive diplomatic measures. China’s military exercises in August were larger and closer to Taiwan than the exercises China carried out during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996. The exercises also included unprecedented live-firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan. This feature closely tracks and analyzes China’s military activities and diplomatic escalation after Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.

Surveying the Experts: China’s Approach to Taiwan

After China’s unprecedented military and diplomatic response to Speaker Pelosi’s visit, ChinaPower surveyed 64 leading experts and former senior U.S. officials about China’s approach to Taiwan. The survey included questions on key issues such as Beijing’s potential timelines for Taiwan’s unification as well as the likelihood of accidents or conflict in the coming years. This feature visualizes and analyzes the results of the survey.

Putting Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s U.S. Transit in Context

In March and April 2023, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen transited the United States and met with U.S. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in California. ​​By having Tsai and McCarthy meet during an unofficial Taiwan transit of the United States, there were hopes that Beijing’s activities would be less escalatory than it was when Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. This feature provides historical context to Tsai’s 2023 transit by assessing trends in previous transits and analyzing Chinese responses.

Tracking China’s April 2023 Military Exercises around Taiwan

Despite hopes that Beijing’s activities following the Tsai-McCarthy meeting would be more limited, China again launched a series of large-scale military drills in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan. China also took significant diplomatic countermeasures against Taiwan and the United States. This feature includes detailed timelines tracking key Chinese military and diplomatic activities before, during, and after the transit.

Analyzing China’s Escalation after Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2023 U.S. Transit

This feature analyzes the important similarities and differences between China’s military and diplomatic activities in August 2022 and April 2023. It also examines the key factors that may have driven China’s overall approach. Using data, it concludes that Beijing carried out less heavy-handed, more calculated measures in April, suggesting it learned from its experience in August.

The post Series: The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

In March and April 2023, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States, during which she met with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. This meeting was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit to Taiwan by Speaker McCarthy, and there were hopes that Beijing would not escalate as much as it did in August 2022 when Beijing provoked the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis after then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. 

China nevertheless carried out significant diplomatic and military measures. Diplomatically, Beijing intensified some of its already-sharp measures aimed at punishing Taipei, while simultaneously softening its approach on other fronts. Militarily, China’s activities were substantively different from those in August 2022, but no less significant. Overall, Beijing appears to have taken a less heavy-handed, more targeted approach this time, suggesting it learned from its experience in August and was better postured to take action. 

China’s More Sophisticated Diplomatic Approach

China’s diplomatic activities took a two-track approach, with some measures aimed at ramping up pressure on Taipei and others aimed at softening China’s approach. This represents a considerable shift from August, when Beijing’s activities were overwhelmingly punitive. It also shows a more sophisticated use of multiple efforts in tandem. 

The analysis on this page draws from ChinaPower research tracking China’s major military and diplomatic activities in response to Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Explore a detailed timeline of Chinese activities here.

EXPLORE

Two Chinese diplomatic activities stand out in comparison to August 2022. First, Beijing appears to have timed a 12-day visit to China by former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou to coincide with Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. This was the first time a former or sitting Taiwan president had traveled to mainland China. As President, Ma endorsed the “1992 consensus” and encouraged greater cross-strait engagement, and as a result, Chinese leaders have been far more willing to engage with Ma and the Kuomintang (KMT) party that he previously led. 

Ma’s visit to China contrasted starkly with Tsai’s transit through the United States. China likely encouraged Ma’s visit to demonstrate that it is willing to engage with China-friendly parties such as the KMT—even as it engaged punitively to President Tsai and her ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 

Beijing’s second major diplomatic maneuver came a few days before the start of Tsai’s U.S. transit, when China poached one of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, Honduras. China reportedly offered Honduras up to $2.95 billion to establish diplomatic relations with China. This is the ninth time China has enticed a country to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China during Tsai’s presidency, and it marks the second time China has poached one of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners around the time of a U.S. transit. In 2018, China established ties with El Salvador a few days after Tsai returned to Taiwan after transiting through the United States. Beijing likely did this again and timed its actions as a demonstration of its influence and power. 

On other fronts, China took measures in April that were similar to those taken in August 2022. China commonly uses disinformation to put pressure on Taiwan, so it is unsurprising that it did so in both August 2022 and April 2023. Ahead of Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan, a Chinese group reportedly published articles condemning her visit and used fake Taiwan news sites to argue that the United States would not be a reliable partner in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Chinese actors also launched several cyberattacks in August, including changing signs and screens to display anti-U.S. messages. In April, China again launched disinformation campaigns, with much of these efforts targeting President Tsai. During her transit of the United States, Chinese consulates in the United States reportedly organized and paid pro-China demonstrators to protest outside of Tsai’s hotels and venues. These protests were in turn amplified by Chinese netizens who also falsely claimed that Tsai had paid the Hudson Institute to present her an award. 

Mirroring its actions in August, Beijing also punished multiple U.S. and Taiwan organizations and individuals this April. Both U.S. institutions that hosted Tsai—the Hudson Institute and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library—were sanctioned. For a second time, China also sanctioned Taiwan representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim, as well as her family and investors and firms tied to her. After Tsai’s transit concluded, Chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Michael McCaul met with Tsai in Taiwan, and shortly after that, China announced sanctions on McCaul as well. Beijing used these sanctions to engage in targeted coercion. They allow Beijing to show domestic and foreign audiences that it is enacting punishments, but they have little or no tangible effect on the wider public in Taiwan or the United States. 

China likewise repeated its use of punitive arrests of Taiwan citizens as an additional show of power against Taiwan. Chinese authorities announced on April 25 the formal arrest of Taiwan pro-independence activist Yang Chih-yuan. Yang was originally detained in August 2022 in the immediate aftermath of Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The formal confirmation of his arrest appears intentionally timed to coincide with the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. Adding to that, the Chinese government confirmed on April 26 the arrest of Li Yanhe, a Taiwan-based publisher. Given that there were no other high-profile arrests of Taiwan citizens between August and April, this too should be seen as intended by Beijing to showcase its displeasure over the Tsai transit. 

China’s other major diplomatic steps varied from last year. Beijing did not announce major new diplomatic “countermeasures” against Washington, as it did in August when it cancelled or suspended eight key areas of U.S.-China dialogue. Whether this should be viewed as a sign of restraint on China’s end is unclear. It could be that there were few remaining areas of U.S.-China engagement to target—seven of the eight key areas of U.S.-China dialogue that China canceled and suspended in August have yet to resume.¹ Instead, China has been reluctant to engage in dialogue with the United States at the highest levels. Beijing has yet to respond to the U.S. request to arrange a phone call between President Biden and President Xi. This request was made public in mid-March after newspapers revealed initial U.S. plans for the Tsai transit. 

On the economic front, Beijing embraced additional measures In August 2022, China suspended imports of Taiwan fish and fruits and cut exports of sand to the island, though these had limited economic impacts on Taiwan. China stopped short of suspending imports or exports of specific goods in April 2023, but it did take some measures: on April 12, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced it was launching an investigation into Taiwan’s trade restrictions on certain Chinese goods. Importantly, the ministry’s notice stated that the investigation should conclude by October 12, 2023, but added that it could be extended until January 12, 2024—the day before Taiwan’s presidential election. Depending on how political dynamics evolve, experts are concerned that China may use the investigation to impose additional economic sanctions or change or cancel parts of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that China and Taiwan signed in 2010 to facilitate trade. 

At the same time, however, China continued to signal a desire to increase cross-strait linkages. On April 10—the last day of China’s major military exercises—Wang Huning, the fourth-ranked member of the Chinese Communist Party’s all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, met with a delegation of Taiwan business executives in Beijing. During the meeting, he called for improved economic and trade exchanges as a means of promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. 

China’s Significant Military Escalation

On the surface, China’s April 2023 military activities differed substantively compared to those in August 2022. Some of the more provocative activities from the 2022 exercise—such as launching missiles over Taiwan and establishing military exercise exclusion zones around the island—were not carried out again in 2023. However, the latest round of military activities also showed considerable continuity and even progression with respect to PLA operations, tactics, and reach. Overall, China’s military activities were no less significant in April 2023 than in August 2022, with both exercises demonstrating the range of capabilities that the PLA is practicing against Taiwan. 

Military Signaling Prior to the Main Exercises

The PLA’s primary activities began on April 8, with the start of large-scale exercises around Taiwan, but Chinese military signaling began days before that while President Tsai was transiting the United States. On April 5, the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced a joint patrol and inspection operation of the Taiwan Strait. As part of this operation, Chinese maritime law enforcement officials were tasked with conducting “on-site inspections” (现场检查) aboard vessels in the Taiwan Strait. 

The operation is significant in multiple respects. First, although there is no evidence that the operation actually stopped any vessels, it laid out an example of what China could do if it wanted to escalate. The intended “targets” of this operation encompassed several commercial shipping routes, including the Pingtan-Taiwan direct container route, the “mini three links” (小三通), and areas with heavy commercial and fishing vessel traffic.²This, coupled with changes in Chinese maritime safety regulations, allows China to set conditions for an escalatory stance in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan. It also reflects another effort to assert Beijing’s claims (which contradict international law) that China has “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the “internal waters” of the Taiwan Strait. Finally, the operation demonstrated China’s civilian mobilization capabilities and its capacity for operational coordination of civilian maritime actors in support of a joint operation. 

Next, Chinese authorities released several announcements of multiple smaller-scale live-fire military exercises. On April 7, the Fujian MSA announced two series of live-fire drills north and south of Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands. These were scheduled to occur during and after the main military exercises; however, both of these announcements were later removed from the MSA website, resulting in uncertainty about the extent to which these exercises took place. Around this same time, military drills were announced at other locations, including multiple exercises off the coast of Liaoning Province (well to the north of Taiwan). 

While there are few details about these drills, the flurry of announcements in a short time frame and the variety of locations of the drills are likely all part of the PLA’s overall activities aimed at countering the Tsai transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy. Together, they served as a show of force and emphasized not only China’s ability to carry out several military activities at once, but also its ability to conduct operations in geographically dispersed areas farther from Taiwan. 

Comparing China's April 2023 and August 2022 Exercises

Following these initial activities, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced that from April 8 to 10, it would “organize combat readiness patrols around Taiwan Island and conduct ‘Joint Sword’ exercises in the Taiwan Strait, around the northern and southern parts of Taiwan Island, and in the sea and airspace to the east of Taiwan Island.” These exercises were the centerpiece of China’s April 2023 military activities and were reminiscent of the large-scale August 2022 exercises. 

At first glance, some aspects of these exercises suggest an overall scaled-back military demonstration of force compared to August. The April Joint Sword exercises lasted three days, while the August exercises were scheduled for four days and later extended to seven. Perhaps most importantly, the April exercises lacked the highly provocative live-fire ballistic missile launches seen in August. On August 4, 2022, the PLA Rocket Force took the unprecedented step of firing multiple ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into the waters around the island. Five of these fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone. In April 2023, the PLA primarily focused on simulating joint precision strikes on and around Taiwan, and the Rocket Force did not fire ballistic missiles near or over the island. 

Another key difference was the amount of information released about the drills. Two days before the start of the August 2022 exercises, Chinese authorities released the coordinates for six distinct exercise exclusion zones encircling the island (and later announced a seventh zone). This allowed for a direct comparison to the exclusion zones that were mapped out during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. In April 2023, the PLA did not announce specific coordinates for its main exercises and commenced the exercises the same day they were announced, providing no advance warning. 

The PLA’s decision to provide less information this time is significant for a few key reasons. First, it could be an indicator that Chinese leaders do not believe they need to pre-notify Taiwan or the international community regarding operations near or around Taiwan. Second, it likely reflects Beijing’s desire to prevent external interference by not showing where its forces could operate. Finally, it suggests more confidence in the PLA’s control of air and naval assets to operate around Taiwan without creating inadvertent hazards. It is likely that China will try to set a new norm of increased military operations around Taiwan without prior notification or announcement. 

Looking to go deeper on the military dimensions of China's April 2023 response? The China Power Project hosted a live event on this topic, featuring a panel of top experts. Watch a recording of the event here.

WATCH HERE

Despite these differences, the April exercises were no less significant than those in August. There were several areas of continuity between the two, as well as substantial new elements. Fundamentally, both the August and April exercises were suggestive of an “encirclement” of Taiwan using PLA Navy forces, with the objective of rehearsing elements of a potential blockade and other kinetic military operations against Taiwan. 

PLA forces were roughly as active around Taiwan this April as they were last August. Information released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) shows that, like in August, PLA vessels surrounded the island. The MND reported a single-day maximum of 12 vessels on April 10, close to the one-day high of 14 seen in August. Crucially, Taiwan’s MND also released maps indicating that, during the exercises, PLA vessels encircled the island in ways reminiscent of the August exercises. 

With respect to air activities, the April exercises surpassed the peak of activity during the August exercises. On the last day of the Joint Sword exercises (April 10), Taiwan’s MND reported that 91 PLA aircraft were operating around Taiwan. This marked an all-time high up to this point and was considerably higher than the highest one-day total during the August 2022 exercises (66 aircraft). During the April exercises, the PLA also averaged higher daily incursions into the air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as well as incursions and crossings of the Taiwan Strait median line. However, it is worth noting that PLA air activity in April spiked higher and then subsided more quickly than in August. 

PLA air and maritime activity around Taiwan is aimed at negating Taiwan’s ADIZ, and the Taiwan Strait median line and is on track to increasingly challenge Taiwan’s contiguous zone. Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ ramped up in 2020 and have become a near daily occurrence. Prior to the August exercises, there were only a handful of reported instances of PLA aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, but China ramped up crossings in August, and this now occurs frequently. Similarly, PLA navy vessels rarely came close to Taiwan’s contiguous zone—a boundary extending 24 nautical miles beyond Taiwan’s territorial baseline—in August, but China reportedly sent multiple vessels right up to Taiwan’s contiguous zone during the April exercises. 

On top of that, the April 2023 exercises saw far more activity from one of China’s aircraft carriers. In the days leading up to the August 2022 exercises, the PLA Navy’s two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, deployed from their respective home ports of Qingdao and Sanya and moved in the waters around China as a show of force, but they were not integral to the exercises taking place around Taiwan. 

By comparison, China’s Shandong aircraft carrier and its carrier group played a primary role in April 2023. The carrier stayed in the waters east of Taiwan for several days before, during, and after the Joint Sword exercises. The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) reported that the Shandong launched a total of 620 sorties between April 7 and 24, including both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. During the exercises, a total of 19 carrier-based J-15 fighters entered Taiwan’s southeast ADIZ—the first time those aircraft have been reported in Taiwan’s ADIZ. Many more carrier-launched sorties occurred near Taiwan (outside of the ADIZ), but there is no data available on the specific amount. Although it is far from certain that China would risk deploying the Shandong or any of its aircraft carriers to such a vulnerable location east of Taiwan in an actual conflict, the carrier operations signaled China’s intent and its efforts to practice capabilities to operate near and attack Taiwan’s east coast. 

Access to Taiwan’s east coast is critical to the island’s defense. Military bases located on the island’s east side are key to force preservation, and the island has long sought the option of moving military assets to the east for protection during the onset of a potential PLA attack or invasion. Given the likely intense fighting in the Taiwan Strait in a cross-strait conflict, access to Taiwan’s bases to the east could provide the easiest way for the United States and allies to flow forces or supplies to Taiwan. This is not lost on China. A researcher at China’s Academy of Military Sciences, Zhao Xiaozhuo, emphasized that the carrier group “played a vital role” in showing the PLA’s ability to project power on Taiwan’s east, which would be crucial to deterring foreign intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict. 

Along with significant naval activity around Taiwan, April also showed an uptick in PLA vessels operating near Japan, according to JMOD reports. Around the time of the August exercises, the JMOD reported seven PLA vessels operating near Japan in the weeks before the exercises, but only one vessel—a Type 052D destroyer—during the period of the exercises. 

By comparison, in the two weeks before and after the start of the April 2023 drills, the JMOD reported 19 distinct PLA vessels near Japan, five of which were tracked around Japan for more than 12 days and three of which were repeatedly tracked for 17 or more days. Some of these vessels included the Shandong and its carrier group, but there were also several other vessels operating separately in the waters on all sides of Japan. This increased PLA activity around Japan was likely intended as a warning and signal to Japan given Tokyo’s heighten concerns that a conflict in Taiwan will negatively impact Japan’s security, as well as its increased military investment and preparations to deal with such contingencies. 

Continued Signaling After the Military Exercises

China’s military signaling continued after the end of the Joint Sword exercises. On April 12, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication revealed that on the preceding day, China privately notified Taiwan that it would close an area of airspace north of Taiwan due to “aerospace activities” related to the launch of an orbital rocket into space. This zone was situated just 85 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern coast, extended into Taiwan’s ADIZ, and spanned a busy route for air traffic in the region. 

China initially warned against aircraft entering the zone from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. on April 16–18. This lengthy period sparked anger, with officials in Taiwan calling it “unprecedented” and Chinese authorities later reducing the airspace closure window to only 27 minutes on April 16. China further muddied the waters when the Fujian MSA announced the closure of the zone to maritime vessels from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. on April 16. When April 16 finally came, China reported it had successfully launched a meteorological satellite on a Long March-4B rocket, and debris from the launch was later detected in the announced zone. 

This episode resulted in confusion and left many unanswered questions. It is not clear why China did not initially acknowledge the closure zone until it was reported by authorities in Taiwan. It is also unclear why the initial three-day window was later shortened to just 27 minutes on one day. This backtracking and lack of clarity may have been the result of poor internal coordination, but the episode was widely seen as part of China’s campaign to pressure and intimidate Taiwan. It is also worth noting that the original time frame overlapped with the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting that was taking place in Japan. 

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On top of that, President Xi Jinping played a role in military messaging when he traveled to the PLA’s Southern Theater Command to inspect the readiness of its naval forces. During his inspection on April 11, Xi stated that the PLA should “analyze and address military issues from a political perspective” and called for the military to “resolutely defend China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and strive to maintain the overall stability of the country’s neighboring regions.” 

Xi also emphasized driving forward the modernization of PLA forces and doctrine, and in a nod to the recent military exercises, he called for the PLA to “intensify force-on-force training based on operational plans.” Xi’s visit and his statements showcase that he believes the PLA plays a crucial role in overall efforts to increasingly exert control over Taiwan through coercive and kinetic means. 

Taken together, China’s military escalation in April should be seen as a continuation of efforts to intimidate Taiwan and allow the PLA to practice a variety of operations around Taiwan. While its activities in April were different in important respects from those in August, they were no less significant. 

Factors Shaping China’s Overall Escalation

It is not exactly clear how and to what extent certain factors shaped the intensity and contours of China’s overall behavior, but a number of initial observations are possible. 

While Chinese leaders likely felt domestic pressure to take action to oppose the transit, it is not clear they faced the same level of pressure as they did in August 2022. There was significantly less coverage of the Tsai transit on Chinese media and social media compared to then-speaker Pelosi’s August trip, when Weibo crashed around the time Pelosi was about to land in Taiwan and many netizens in China were tracking her flight to the island. It is possible that the Chinese public were either generally less aware or less interested in the transit or that Beijing did a better job of controlling public expression of views. This could have created more space for Beijing to act as it sees fit.  

After Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, China engaged in significantly escalatory activities, but this resulted in substantial diplomatic backlash. This likely influenced Beijing’s thinking this time, and it sought to achieve its objectives while reducing backlash. This aligns with Beijing’s use of more sophisticated diplomatic efforts—namely Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to China and the poaching of Honduras from Taiwan—which put pressure on Taipei and showcased Beijing’s willingness to work with China-friendly elements in Taiwan. 

It is also possible that China acknowledged U.S. and Taiwan efforts to try to address some of Beijing’s concerns and aimed to craft a set of countermeasures to the Tsai transit visit that was proportional to what Beijing viewed as the level of Taiwan and U.S. “provocativeness.” Beijing closely monitored Tsai’s transit and likely recognized that certain elements of Tsai’s transit were scaled down to reduce the profile and public nature of her engagements. Beijing might have also appreciated the attempt by Washington and Taipei to at least delay a Tsai-McCarthy meeting in Taiwan by offering McCarthy a chance to meet in the United States. If that is the case, it suggests that China will continue to escalate against future high-profile meetings between senior U.S. and Taiwan officials but will adjust the level of its activities based on its perceptions of the meeting’s dynamics. 

Want to learn more about China’s activities related to Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan? Explore our feature here.

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Importantly, Chinese decisionmaking does not occur in a vacuum, so other geopolitical factors play a role. In recent months, Beijing has accelerated diplomatic efforts and sought to improve China’s international image. China’s continued support for Russia throughout the war in Ukraine has led to a considerable fraying of China-Europe relations. As part of Beijing’s efforts to restore ties with the region, President Emmanuel Macron of France and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen were in China from April 5 to 7 to meet with President Xi. 

A significant Chinese escalation during their visit would have undercut Beijing’s efforts to smooth over tensions with Europe. Beijing appears to have waited until the departure of Macron and von der Leyen (and Ma Ying-jeou) to announce some key parts of its activities, including small live-fire exercises near Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands (which were announced the day that they left China), as well as the large-scale exercises around Taiwan (which were announced and started the following day). 

Broader geopolitical trends may have also factored into Beijing’s calculus in its actions toward the United States and its allies. Around the same time as the Tsai transit, China targeted several major U.S. companies amid mounting economic and technological competition. On March 31, Japan announced restrictions on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China in a crucial move to support sweeping export controls issued by the Biden administration in the fall of 2022. On the same day as Japan’s announcement, the Cyberspace Administration of China announced a “cybersecurity review” of U.S. chip manufacturer Micron Technologies in apparent retaliation. Beijing has targeted other U.S. companies as well. On March 24, officials raided the Chinese offices of U.S. due diligence firm Mintz Group and on April 28, officials questioned staff at the Shanghai office of U.S. consulting firm Bain & Company. China also reportedly slowed its review process of proposed mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies. 

These moves are not explicitly part of Beijing’s countermeasures against the Tsai transit, but they likely factor into Beijing’s thinking. Amid heated U.S.-China tensions, Beijing regularly employs measures against the United States in the context of overall tensions and competition, and Chinese officials likely calibrated their actions against the Tsai transit to factor in action along other vectors. Thus, the absence of harsh diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United States after the transit may reflect the fact that China has already taken—or was planning to take—actions against the United States unrelated to the Tsai transit. 

Finally, the approaching 2024 Taiwan presidential election also factors into Beijing’s calculus. President Tsai and the DPP have successfully leveraged past Chinese aggression to their electoral benefit. Most notably, China’s 2019 crackdown in Hong Kong severely worsened perceptions of Beijing among the Taiwan public, which aided the DPP in the 2020 presidential elections. This April, China avoided engaging in some of the activities that would affect Taiwan as a whole—such as suspending trade of certain goods and launching ballistic missiles over the island—but still demonstrated the range of military options China has against the island. At the same time, it embraced measures to directly efforts pressure President Tsai and the DPP ahead of the elections. 

China’s decision to invite Ma Ying-jeou to China at this time was a key part of this. Ma’s trip to China, and his talking points after the trip, likely helped Beijing message to the Taiwan people that Beijing is open to working with leaders in Taipei. It was also meant to show that working with Beijing will bring Taiwan peace and prosperity, while pushing for Taiwan independence will create crises and conflict. Beijing’s messaging sets the stage for how to interpret Chinese actions toward Taiwan and does not rule out the possibility of another major escalation between now and January 2024 if Beijing perceives Taipei is embracing more “pro-independence” actions. 

Overall, Beijing’s escalation against the Tsai transit showcases a China that is learning from its past actions and adapting its countermeasures based on how it assesses the level of “provocativeness” of Taiwan and U.S. activities. China also appears to be sensitive to the potential costs of its actions and is seeking to advance China’s claims over Taiwan using more sophisticated means beyond just punitive measures. Beijing demonstrated its willingness to take firm and escalatory measures vis-à-vis Taiwan, and it is likely to continue to do so in the future. 

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Matthew Slade

The post Analyzing China’s Escalation after Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2023 U.S. Transit appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

In late March and early April 2023, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States and held an in-person meeting with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began increasing its activities as Tsai was in the United States and particularly after her meeting with McCarthy. On April 8, the day after Tsai arrived back in Taiwan, the PLA announced and launched large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. These exercises are more significant than China’s responses to past Taiwan presidential transits, and they are reminiscent of the unprecedented PLA response to then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.  

In contrast to China’s major show of military force, Beijing has taken relatively less direct diplomatic and economic measures to punish Taiwan and the United States since April 2. China issued four strong statements denouncing the transit and meeting with McCarthy on April 6 and sanctioned a handful of U.S. and Taiwan entities afterwards. On April 10, China signaled desire to deepen economic and other exchanges with Taiwan. What remains to be seen is how former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s trip to China will impact domestic politics in Taiwan—a trip that was likely encouraged and at least partially orchestrated by Beijing. For example, Beijing likely welcomed Ma’s remarks to the press on April 7 after he returned to Taiwan – Ma characterized Taipei’s current leadership and policy as one leading Taiwan towards danger and war and warned that Taiwan has a choice between peace and war.  

This page tracks and analyzes key activities China has taken so far, starting April 2, the week of Tsai’s meeting with Speaker McCarthy. The timelines below reflect information available through April 30, 2023.¹ This page will be updated with additional analysis and new information as it becomes available. Use the table of contents below to jump to a section of the page.

Background

The meeting between President Tsai and Speaker McCarthy was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit by Speaker McCarthy to Taiwan—at least postponing his intended travel to the island. By having Tsai and McCarthy meet during an unofficial transit of the United States, there were hopes that Beijing would not escalate as much as it did when Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. 

China used the visit by Speaker Pelosi to provoke the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, which included unprecedented military exercises around the island. Compared to the previous Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, the August 2022 exercises were closer to the main island of Taiwan—with some of the exercise zones extending into Taiwan’s territorial waters. The PLA Rocket Force also fired multiple ballistic missiles over the main island of Taiwan, with some of them landing into the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the Philippines. Beijing also embraced limited economic punishments against Taiwan and canceled and postponed select areas of U.S.-China engagement and cooperation. 

Want to learn more about China’s activities related to Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan? Explore our feature here.

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Timeline of Key Chinese Military and Related Activities

Sunday, April 2 

• The PLA Eastern Theater Command reported that it sent the Type 054A frigate Xiangtan, Type 052D guided-missile destroyer Taiyuan, and Type 956EM destroyer Taizhou to conduct live-fire combat exercises in the East China Sea.  
• It was reported that a combined arms brigade of the PLA Ground Force based in Guangdong received a large delivery of Type 08 wheeled armored vehicles, which are necessary for “rapid-reaction combat including rapid deployment and mobilized assault missions.”  
• According to an announcement by the Liaoning Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), military exercises in the Yellow Sea and Bohai region began on April 2 and continued through April 9.

Monday, April 3 

• It was reported that the Hainan, a Type 075 amphibious assault ship, carried out a joint sea-air exercise in waters to the west of China’s Guangdong Province. Official Chinese media directly linked this and other exercises to Tsai’s planned meeting with McCarthy.
• The Hainan MSA announced live-fire exercises would be held in an area off of the island’s northeastern coast from April 4–6.  

Tuesday, April 4 

• 14 PLA aircraft and 3 naval vessels were detected around Taiwan by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Two of the detected aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ. 
• It was reported that a combined arms brigade under the PLA 72nd Group Army held a combat-oriented beach assault exercise. The 72nd Group Army is an amphibious force that is responsible for cross-sea landing missions. 
• Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force observed the Type 052C destroyer Changchun sailing northwest through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan on April 4. It then sailed northward through waters approximately 70 km west of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on April 5. The vessel had previously sailed south through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island on April 3.

Wednesday, April 5 

• China announced a three-day “special joint patrol and inspection operation” in the central and northern areas of the Taiwan Strait. As part of this operation, Chinese maritime law enforcement officials were tasked with conducting on-site inspections (现场检查) aboard vessels in the Taiwan Strait, but there were no reports of such on-site inspections taking place. The operation was led by China’s first large-scale patrol vessel in the Taiwan Strait, the Haixun 06. Vessels from the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration, East China Sea Rescue Bureau and the East China Sea Maritime Security Center joined. Notably, the first law enforcement patrol the Haixun 06 embarked on occurred during then-Speaker of the House Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. In response to Haixun 06’s April 2023 operations, Taiwan’s Maritime and Port Bureau issued a statement that relevant shipping companies have been told to refuse these inspections.  
• The PLA Navy’s Shandong aircraft carrier passed through the Bashi Channel and into waters off of Taiwan’s southeastern coast for long-range training in the West Pacific. Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Shandong was accompanied by the Type 054A frigate Liuzhou and the Chaganhu, a Type 901 fast combat support ship. The ships traveled eastward in an area 186 miles south of Hateruma Island. Japanese guided-missile destroyer Sawagiri shadowed the carrier group. Notably, the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier was sailing about 400 nautical miles east of Taiwan that day.  
• A PLA news site reported that a vessel-borne helicopter regiment affiliated with the PLA Eastern Theater Command Navy carried out landing exercises during both day and night on the Type 075 amphibious assault ship Guangxi over several days.  
• Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force observed the Type 054A frigate Anyang sailing northwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan on April 5. It then sailed northward through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sailed northward through the waters approximately 80 km west of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on April 6. The vessel had previously sailed south through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako on April 3.  

Friday, April 7 

• The Fujian MSA announced that live-fire drills would be held off the northern coast of Pingtan Island on April 10 for 13 hours. The exercise zone covers an area of approximately 39 square kilometers (15 square miles). At its closest point, the exercise zone is approximately 30 kilometers (19 miles) from Dongju Island, the southernmost island of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands. However, the announcement was later removed from the MSA website, raising questions about whether the exercises took place.  
• The Fujian MSA also announced live-fire drills would be held in Luoyuan Bay, northwest of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands. The drills were scheduled from 8 am – 12 pm on April 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 20. However, the announcement was later removed from the MSA website, raising questions about whether the exercises took place or will later in April.  
• Japan’s MoD reported that China’s Shandong aircraft carrier and its escort ships were approximately 242 miles (390 km) south of the Japanese island of Miyako. 
• The Liaoning MSA announced three military exercises that would occur in the Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea. Exercises were scheduled for 8 hours on April 8 and 10 hours on April 9. Immediately following the April 9 exercise, another exercise would begin that same day, from April 9 to April 16.

Saturday, April 8 

• At 8:16 am Beijing time, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) announced that from April 8–10, it would “organize combat readiness patrols around Taiwan Island and conduct “Joint Sword” exercises in the Taiwan Strait, around the northern and southern parts of Taiwan Island, and in the sea and airspace to the east of Taiwan Island.” At 10:01 am, the ETC repeated the announcement, adding that the exercises are “a serious warning against ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces’ collusion and provocation with external forces, and a necessary action to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The exercises involved joint operations across the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Forces.  
• On the first day, the exercises focused on testing the PLA’s capability to seize control of sea, air, and information domains under the support of the joint combat system. PLA Navy frigates and destroyers practiced short-range assaults, long-range deterrence, and air defense and anti-missile drills. There were also joint anti-submarine drills with cooperation from police patrol boats. Dozens of J-16 and J-10C fighters carried out live ammunition and medium and long range air combat drills with the support of early warning aircraft, jammers, and refueling aircraft. PLA Rocket Force conventional missile brigades were also dispatched. 
• As part of the exercises, the Type 052D destroyer Taiyuan reportedly came within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan Island—the point where Taiwan’s contiguous zone starts. This suggests Chinese vessels are operating increasingly close to the island; however, there are no reports of vessels entering Taiwan’s territorial waters (which extend 12 nautical miles from Taiwan’s territorial baseline).    
• Taiwan’s MND reported that by 11 am, 42 PLA aircraft and 8 vessels were detected in areas around Taiwan. Later, Taiwan’s MND reported a total of 71 aircraft and 9 vessels around Taiwan. Up to this point, this was by far the highest figure reported in 2023, and tied for the highest ever recorded.² Of these, 45 aircraft crossed the southern, central, and northern areas of the Taiwan Strait median line and entered into the southwest ADIZ.  
• Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong was over 267 miles (430 km) south of Miyako Island. 
• Reportedly, a PLA amphibious landing ship carried out live-fire exercises just 30 miles (50 km) northwest of the Matsu Islands in the Luoyuan Bay. The vessel “fired shells at targets on land and at sea.” This aligned with an April 7 announcement by the Fujian MSA of a series of exercises over several days in the area.

Sunday, April 9 

• China continued with large-scale exercises around the island. According to a CCTV report, “Under the unified command of the theater’s Joint Operations Command Center, multiple types of units carried out simulated joint precision strikes against key targets on Taiwan Island and the surrounding waters, and continued to maintain the momentum of encircling the island.” 
• As part of the exercise, several PLA aircraft and vessels worked jointly to create a “shore-sea-air joint strike system.” The PLA also released an animation that depicts several land-based assets, aircraft, and vessels launching joint precision strikes at key targets on Taiwan.  
• According to reports, about 20 vessels—half from China and half from Taiwan—were engaged in a stand-off near the median line that divides the Taiwan Strait. However, details about the situation remain scant.  
• Taiwan MND reported that a total of 70 PLA aircraft and 11 vessels had been detected around Taiwan that day. Of these aircraft, 35 crossed the southern, central, and northern areas of the Taiwan Strait median line and entered the southwest and southeast ADIZ. Notably, four J-15 fighters took off from the Shandong aircraft carrier and entered Taiwan’s southeastern ADIZ, marking the first time J-15s have entered the ADIZ.  
• The Japanese MoD reported that the Shandong had moved north, coming within 142 miles (230 km) of Miyako Island.  

Monday, April 10 

• On the final day of the “Joint Sword” exercises, CCTV reporting noted that drills focused on “joint shock and deterrence and island closure and control” (联合震慑，孤岛封控). This emphasized maneuvers to cut of access to the island from seas east of Taiwan. Several destroyers and frigates carried out suppressive combat patrol missions and joint blockade simulations, and the Shandong aircraft carrier group participated in the final day of drills from the waters east of Taiwan. The carrier group consisted of one Type 055 destroyer, one Type 052D destroyer, two Type 054A frigates, one Type 901 replenishment ship, and there was likely a nuclear-powered attack submarine as well.
• Taiwan’s MND reported a record-high number of PLA aircraft around Taiwan. A total of 91 aircraft and 12 vessels had been detected. Of those aircraft, 54 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s southwest and southeast ADIZ. For the second day in a row, J-15 fighters entered the southeast ADIZ after presumably launching from the Shandong carrier.
• Japan’s MoD announced that between April 7-9, the Shandong carrier launched a total of roughly 120 sorties, including about 80 aircraft and 40 helicopter sorties. Japan's MoD also announced that since March 28, the PLA Type 815A electronic reconnaissance vessel Kaiyangxing had been circling Japan.
• Shortly after 6 pm, the ETC announced the successful conclusion of the “joint cruise and patrol special operation” in the Taiwan Strait. 

Tuesday, April 11

• The day after the conclusion of the “Joint Sword” exercises, Taiwan’s MND reported it had detected 26 aircraft and nine vessels carrying out combat readiness patrols. In total, 35 aircraft and 8 vessels detected in the region, and 15 of these aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ or crossed the Taiwan Strait median line.
• Reuters stated that there were small-scale military exercises occurring off the coast of Fuzhou, which were likely part of the previously announced exercises by Fujian MSA.
• Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong aircraft carrier was about 180 miles (290 km) from Japan’s Miyako Island.

Wednesday, April 12

• Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communication reported that on April 11, China had issued a no-fly zone due to “aerospace activities” that China would be conducting in a busy region of airspace north of Taiwan from April 16 to 18, from 9 am to 2 pm each day. China then reduced the timeframe to just 27 minutes, from 9:30 am to 9:57 am on April 16. This zone overlaps within Taiwan’s ADIZ and is just 85 nautical miles from Taiwan’s northern coast. Taiwan’s Central News Agency reported that China’s modified "no fly zone" will impact 33 flights in total.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 26 PLA aircraft and 7 PLAN vessels around Taiwan. A total of 14 aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line.
• China’s Shandong carrier group was still operating in the West Pacific, 137 miles (220 km) south of Japan’s Miyako Island.

Thursday, April 13

• China announced a new warning related to a zone north of Taiwan. The Fujian MSA announced that vessels should not enter the zone due to the possibility of falling rocket debris from 9:00 am to 3:00 pm on Sunday, April 16.
• The Hainan MSA announced four-day military exercises from April 16–19 in the South China Sea northeast of Hainan Island.  
• The Shandong carrier group moved southeast, further into the West Pacific. Japan’s MoD tracked the group almost 286 miles (460 km) south-southeast of Miyako Island.
• The Liaoning MSA announced a day of military drills on April 14 in the Bohai Sea.
• Taiwan’s MND reported that it detected 4 PLA aircraft and 8 naval vessels around Taiwan. One aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Friday, April 14

• Taiwan’s MND reported 6 PLA aircraft and 4 navy vessels around the island. Two PLA aircraft crossed the median line or entered Taiwan’s SW ADIZ.
• Regarding the airspace and maritime closure zone announced for April 16, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that reports describing it as a “no-fly zone” was “not accurate.”
• China’s Shandong carrier continued moving east away from Taiwan and reportedly was 323 miles (520 km) south-west of the Japanese-administers Okinotorishima reef.
• The Liaoning MSA announced three separate drills in the Bohai Sea and Bohai Strait. Two of the exercises were scheduled to last only one day on April 15 and April 16, while the third was scheduled from April 16–23.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 8 PLA aircraft and 5 PLA naval vessels around the island. Three PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. 

Saturday, April 15

• Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong carrier group was 230 miles (370 km) Southeast of Okinotorishima reef in the West Pacific.
• Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense observed 15 PLA aircraft and 4 PLAN vessels around Taiwan. Four of the PLA aircraft entered the southeast and southwest portions of Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Sunday, April 16

• China reported it had successfully launched a Long March-4B rocket that was carrying a meteorological satellite (Fengyun-3 07, also referred to as Fengyun-3G) from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in Gansu Province. Debris from the launch was later detected in the previously announced no-fly zone. The zone was reportedly free of aircraft between 9:30 am and 10:20 am.
• The Shandong carrier was tracked by the Japanese MoD 441 miles (710 km) south-southeast of Okinotorishima reef. Additionally, Japan’s MoD reported that aircraft based on the Shandong conducted 210 sorties from April 10-16, and from April 7–16, there was a total of 330 sorties. Japan scrambled fighter jets in response to this activity.
• The USS Milius Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait, just a week after it sailed past Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea. China’s Ministry of Foreign affairs accused the United States of disrupting peace in the Strait. The PLA Eastern Theater Command issued a statement and ensured that they will “resolutely defend national sovereignty and regional peace.”
• Taiwan’s MND reported 18 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA navy vessels around Taiwan. Four PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest and southeast ADIZ.

Monday, April 17

• The Qingdao MSA announced 3 hours of “major” military activities on April 18 in an area of the Yellow Sea. The coordinates for the exercise indicate an area along the coast of the port city of Qingdao, but further details of the exercises were not released.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 12 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Four of the aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Tuesday, April 18

• Taiwan announced it plans to purchase up to 400 U.S.-made land-launched Harpoon missiles as part of deal approved in 2020 by the United States Congress.
• Reportedly, China conducted a three-hour military drill in the Yellow Sea, as announced by the Qingdao MSA the day before.
• The Guangdong MSA announced a day of military exercises on April 20 near the Pearl River Delta.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 2 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels operating near the island. One of the aircraft entered Taiwan’s Southeast ADIZ.

Wednesday, April 19

• The Shanghai MSA announced that live-fire drills would take place on April 20 for six hours near the mouth of the Yangtze estuary.
• The Liaoning MSA announced two days of military drills in the northern Bohai Sea from April 25–27.
• The Hainan MSA announced  military drills in the South China Sea from April 21–23.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 7 PLA navy vessels around Taiwan.

Thursday, April 20

• The Liaoning MSA announced new military drills in the Bohai Sea from April 21–22.
• The Shandong MSA announced military drills in the Yellow Sea near Qingdao from April 21–24. This exercise is occurring in the same location as the 3 hour long “major” military activities that took place on April 18.
• The Guangdong MSA announced three days of live-fire training from April 23–25 in the South China Sea.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 19 PLA aircraft and 5 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. 10 aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered the island’s ADIZ.

Friday, April 21

• The Liaoning MSA announced military exercises in the Bohai Sea from April 23–30.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 12 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan.

Saturday, April 22

• Taiwan’s MND reported 4 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Of these aircraft, 3 entered Taiwan’s southwest and southeast ADIZ.

Sunday, April 23

• Taiwan’s MND reported 13 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels near Taiwan. One of the aircraft entered Taiwan’s southeast ADIZ.

Monday, April 24

• The Liaoning MSA announced seven hours of military drills in the Bohai Strait scheduled to take place on April 25.
• Taiwan’s premier Chen Chien-jen revealed that the United States and Taiwan are discussing the potential for building a U.S. weapons stockpile near the region, which would grant Taiwan weapons access in the event of a cross-Strait contingency.
• Taiwan’s MND announced that the PLA Shandong aircraft carrier was detected only 120 nautical miles southeast of Taiwan’s southern tip, and the vessel was expected to sail through waters southeast of Taiwan later that day. Japan’s MoD reported that the Shandong aircraft carrier group was travelling west back towards the South China Sea
• Taiwan’s MND also reported 9 PLA aircraft and 11 PLA navy vessels around Taiwan, with one aircraft entering Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Tuesday, April 25

• The Liaoning MSA announced 10 hours of military drills in the northern Bohai Sea on April 26.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 6 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. One aircraft entered the southeast ADIZ region.

Wednesday, April 26

• The Hainan MSA announced four hours of military drills to take place on April 27.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 12 PLA aircraft and 4 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Five aircraft either crossed the Taiwan Strait median line of entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.

Thursday, April 27

• The Liaoning MSA announced that military exercises will take place in the Yellow Sea between April 30 and May 7.
• Taiwan’s MND reported 38 PLA aircraft and 6 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan, marking a high point in Chinese activity since the end of major exercises in early April. 19 of the detected aircraft either crossed the median line or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ. Notably, a Chinese TB-001 Scorpion UAV encircled Taiwan on its southern, eastern, and northern sides.

Friday, April 28

• Taiwan’s MND reported that 17 PLA aircraft and 8 PLA naval vessels were around Taiwan. 13 of the detected aircraft either crossed the Taiwan Strait median line or entered Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Saturday, April 29

• Taiwan’s MND detected 10 PLA aircraft and 6 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. One of the detected aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.
• The Japanese MoD reported three Chinese ships sailing between Okinawa and Miyako Island towards the west Pacific. The three ships were a guided missile destroyer, a frigate, and a supply ship. Japan’s MoD also detected a Chinese intelligence ship sailing north through the Tsushima Strait.

Sunday, April 30

• Taiwan’s MND reported 7 PLA aircraft and 3 PLA naval vessels around Taiwan. Two aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ.
• The Japanese MoD tracked five Chinese ships as they sailed north through the Tsushima Strait, including three guided missile destroyers, one frigate and a replenishment ship.

Timeline of Key Chinese Diplomatic and Non-Military Activities

Similar to its military activities, China’s direct diplomatic and non-military responses escalated after the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. From April 6 onwards, China embraced sanctions on select U.S. and Taiwan entities. Beijing, however, appears to be balancing its desire to punish Tsai and the current government in Taipei with a broader imperative to increase various forms of economic and political exchanges between China and Taiwan.  

Tuesday, April 4 

• One day prior to the Tsai-McCarthy meeting, the congressional liaison at the Chinese embassy in Washington Li Xiang sent an email to members of Congress who would be in attendance at the meeting, urging them to not meet with Tsai. Li warned that China opposes “any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan” and that China “will most likely take necessary and resolute actions in response.”  

Thursday, April 6 

• In a highly orchestrated public move, four major Chinese government actors and departments each issued public statements denouncing Tsai’s transit and meeting with Speaker McCarthy.  
• China’s top legislative body, the National People’s Congress, asserted, “The action of McCarthy, the third highest-ranking official of the U.S. government, has seriously broken the commitment made by the United States to China on the Taiwan question” and it reiterated that “the Taiwan issue” is “the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations.”   
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement that warned that “‘Taiwan independence’ and cross-Strait peace and stability are as irreconcilable as fire and water,” promising that “the pursuit of ‘Taiwan independence’ will lead nowhere.”  
• The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office condemned the “DPP authorities” who “promote Taiwan-US collusion.” It noted that Tsai and the DPP are pushing Taiwan toward a dangerous brink of potential conflict. The office warned that it “will take firm measures to punish the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and their actions” and “any act of seeking ‘independence’ will be smashed to pieces under the powerful force of the Chinese sons and daughters to oppose ‘independence’ and promote reunification.” 
• China’s MND issued a statement saying that the PLA “sticks to its duties and missions” and “resolutely defends national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 

Friday, April 7 

• The Taiwan Work Office issued sanctions on certain institutions and individuals in both Taiwan and the United States. Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s representative to the United States, was sanctioned for a second time. The sanctions bar her from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, or Macao due to her “diehard” support for “Taiwan independence.” China also sanctioned the leaders of Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation (a think tank focusing on cross-Strait relations) and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (a regional organization of liberal democratic political parties in Asia). In the United States, China sanctioned the Hudson Institute and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, and specific administrators at each organization, freezing any assets they had in China and barring them from entering the country.  
• In a MFA press conference, spokesperson Mao Ning emphasized that “the Taiwan question is not about democracy, but about China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” claiming “the sovereignty and territory of China have never been divided and shall never be divided.” She asserted that “the future of Taiwan lies in China’s reunification, and the wellbeing of the people in Taiwan hinges on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 

Monday, April 10 

• Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said “the combat readiness security patrol encircling the Taiwan Island and the ‘Joint Sword’ exercises is a stern warning to the provocative activities of ‘Taiwan independence’”secessionist forces and their collusion with external forces,” highlighting the exercises as “a necessary move to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 
• Wang Huning, a Politburo Standing Committee member and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, met with a delegation of Taiwan business executives led by Liu Chao-shiuan, co-president of the Cross-Strait CEO Summit in Beijing. Wang messaged the desire for improved economic and trade exchanges and that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait “cannot be realized with the existence of ‘Taiwan independence.’”

Wednesday, April 12

• China’s Ministry of Commerce announced it was launching an investigation into Taiwan’s trade restrictions on over 2,400 mainland goods at the request of several trade groups. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council warned that the investigation will not improve cross-strait trade but make future cooperation more difficult.

Wednesday, April 19

• Amid speculation that China’s investigation into trade barriers between Taiwan and the mainland would result in the termination of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECTA) that was signed in 2010, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council urged Beijing to keep the ECTA in place.
• China’s Taiwan Affairs Office added Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to its list of “Unreliable Entities” after arms manufactured by both companies were sold to Taiwan. Senior executives from both companies are now barred from China.

Wednesday, April 26

• China confirmed that it had arrested Li Yanhe (penname Fucha), a Taiwan-based publisher on the grounds that his activities were "endangering national security." News of his arrest came a day after Chinese authorities announced the formal arrest of a leading Taiwanese nationalist politician for “secession” whom they detained in August 2022.

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Matthew Slade

The post Tracking China’s April 2023 Military Exercises around Taiwan appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen transited through the United States in late March and early April of 2023. This marks her 7th transit through the United States during her time as Taiwan’s leader, and is the 29th U.S. transit by a sitting president of Taiwan since the first in 1994.¹ Due to the unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, these trips are designated as private unofficial transits rather than official government-to-government visits. Tsai’s 2023 transit is distinguished by an in-person meeting between President Tsai and U.S. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, which marks the highest-level meeting to take place during such a transit.  

China strongly opposes these transits, arguing that they are violations of China’s “one-China principle” and an attempt to “propagate ‘Taiwan independence.’” In the past, China has enacted a wide range of punitive measures against Taiwan and the United States after such transits. The scale and intensity of Beijing’s actions tends to be based on their perceptions of the current state of U.S.-China-Taiwan dynamics and other linked geopolitical events, as well as the specific details of the transit itself. 

This ChinaPower feature contextualizes Tsai’s 2023 transit by breaking down the facts surrounding past transits and analyzing China’s past behavior. Use the table of contents below to jump to a section of the page.

The Details of President Tsai’s 2023 Transit

During her 2023 transit, Tsai stopped in New York City from March 29–31 on her way to Guatemala and Belize. The following week, she stopped in Los Angeles from April 4-6 as she returned to Taiwan. The most defining and critically watched aspect of her trip was an in-person meeting with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy and other congressional leaders at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. 

The New York Stop 

Tsai arrived by plane in New York on Wednesday, March 29, where she was received at John F. Kennedy International Airport by Taiwan Representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim and Laura Rosenberger, the newly appointed Chairperson of the American Institute in Taiwan (the unofficial de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan). In the evening, Tsai attended and spoke at a banquet dinner with Taiwan expatriates and Taiwanese-Americans. In her speech, Tsai lauded Taiwan’s resilience during the Covid-19 pandemic, remarked that Taiwan is “rising in global importance,” and described U.S.-Taiwan relations as “closer than ever.” State and local officials were in attendance, including New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, Deputy Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly Raj Mukherji, State Senator of New Jersey Gordon Johnson, and State Senator of New York Iwen Chu.  

During her only full day in New York on March 30, Tsai visited businesses owned by young Taiwanese-Americans, and she met with Taiwan expatriates and Taiwanese-Americans at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO). While at TECO, Tsai met with AIT Chairperson Laura Rosenberger, as well as permanent representatives to the United Nations of countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Tsai also met with U.S. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries—the most senior person she has met with in-person during her U.S. transits up to that point. In the evening, Tsai attended a private reception and event hosted by the Hudson Institute, where she received the organization’s Global Leadership Award.

On the morning of March 31, Tsai met with senators Dan Sullivan of Alaska, Joni Ernst of Iowa, and Mark Kelly of Arizona before she concluded her transit through New York and embarked to Guatemala.  

The Los Angeles Stop 

Tsai arrived in Los Angeles on the afternoon of April 4. She was received at Los Angeles International Airport by Taiwan Representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim, Chairperson of the American Institute in Taiwan Laura Rosenberger, and Director General of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles Amino C.Y. Chi.

Among other activities, Tsai met with Speaker Kevin McCarthy on April 5, with other U.S. representatives in attendance. The meeting was framed as an alternative to an immediate visit by Speaker McCarthy to Taiwan, at least postponing his intended travel to the island. By having Tsai and McCarthy meet during an unofficial Taiwan transit of the United States, there were hopes that Beijing would be more constrained in its response than it was when Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022.

China used the visit by Speaker Pelosi to provoke the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, which included unprecedented military exercises around the island. Compared to the previous Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, the August 2022 exercises were closer to the main island of Taiwan—with some of the exercise zones extending into Taiwan’s territorial waters. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force also fired multiple ballistic missiles over the main island of Taiwan, with some of them landing into the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the Philippines. Beijing also embraced limited economic punishments against Taiwan and cancelled and postponed select areas of U.S.-China engagement and cooperation.

Click to enlarge.

While there were hopes that Beijing would respond in a more limited fashion, China again chose to stage large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. To learn more about Chinese activities in the wake of Tsai's transit, explore this ChinaPower feature.

The Geopolitical Backdrop

Tsai’s transit is occurring amid worsening U.S.-China relations and growing Chinese concern that the United States is “playing the ‘Taiwan card’ and using Taiwan to contain China.” In February 2023, in a reversal of typical low-profile U.S.-Taiwan engagements, it was publicly reported that Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu met with senior U.S. officials—including Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman—in Arlington, Virginia. Later that month, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase visited Taiwan, marking the second senior Pentagon official to visit Taiwan since 2019.  

In a reflection of deepening tensions, Chinese President Xi Jinping took the unprecedented step of explicitly calling out the United States during the annual “Two Sessions” meetings in Beijing in March 2023. In his remarks, Xi stated “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression of China.” Similarly, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang warned that “mishandling the Taiwan question will shake the very foundation of China-U.S. relations.”

U.S. Approaches to Transits

The United States has not had official ties with Taiwan since it formally established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1979. As a result, Taiwan presidents have only been able to travel to the United States in the form of private visits and unofficial transits rather than official government-to-government visits. 

Although Taiwan presidential transits are private and unofficial, the U.S. government plays a significant role in shaping the nature and content of transits given their potential impact on cross-Strait dynamics, U.S.-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations. The Clinton administration, for example, initially denied then-President Lee Teng-hui a visa but was pressured by Congress to allow him a private visit. In 2001, then-President Chen Shui-bian was not allowed to hold public events. This was reversed by President Bush in 2002, but the Bush Administration began limiting Chen’s activities by 2006 due to concerns of Chen’s policies towards China.  

U.S. treatment of these transits became more consistent under Taiwan’s then-President Ma Ying-jeou, during which he met with local and congressional leaders and held public events. Since 2016, the United States has gradually granted President Tsai Ing-wen more flexibility and time to engage in activities in the United States during her stops.

Trends in Past Transits

Understanding Tsai’s 2023 transit requires situating it in the broader history of past Taiwan presidential transits. For much of the last three decades, Taiwan’s presidents have frequently conducted transits through the United States on their way to and from countries that have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.² These transits occur under the practical purpose of needing to refuel during long-haul flights, but they also provide opportunities for Taiwan’s leaders to engage with the United States. Over time, these transits have evolved in terms of frequency and duration, location, and format.  

Frequency and Duration

The first transit through the United States occurred in 1994 and was short-lived. Taiwan’s then-President Lee Teng-hui was scheduled to make a refueling stop in Honolulu while on his way to Central America and South Africa. Concerned about the thorny politics of such a move and the potential backlash from China, the Clinton administration denied Lee a visa to enter the country and did not permit him to spend the night in Honolulu. While refueling, Lee chose not to leave the plane in protest of his treatment.  

In the years following this inaugural transit, the stopovers eventually became much more commonplace and normalized. Tsai’s 2023 transit will mark the 29th. On average, the transits have taken place on a near-annual basis, with some years seeing two transits. The last three years were an exception to this. Due primarily to the Covid-19 pandemic, no transits took place between 2020 and 2022.

Under Tsai, the length of time spent in the United States has increased notably. Some of her predecessors’ transits were measured in minutes or hours, with several isolated to the airport. By comparison, all of Tsai’s visits have included overnight stays and a greater variety of activities. Tsai’s July 2019 transit stretched out over five days and four nights, making it the longest of any transit.

Location

It has also become common practice for presidents to stop in two U.S. cities while transiting. All but one of Tsai’s six previous transits have included two locations, and her 2023 transit will follow this trend. Transits have largely been concentrated on the western side of the United States. Tsai’s 2023 visit will mark the 13th stop at Los Angeles. San Francisco has hosted six transits. New York (five stops) and Houston (four stops) have also been popular locations. To date, there has been no Taiwan presidential transits that involved stops in the larger Washington, D.C. metropolitan and capital region (D.C., Virginia, or Maryland). 

Transit stops gravitate toward cities with large populations of overseas-Taiwan citizens and Taiwanese-Americans. In 2021, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated there were 210,429 people of Taiwan ancestry in the U.S., with the largest populations in California (94,727), New York (18,425), and Texas (16,211). The greater Los Angeles area alone has upwards of 45,000 Taiwanese people, contributing to the frequency of transits through the city. 

It is worth noting that Taiwan’s presidents have infrequently transited through other countries besides the United States. In 2006, then-President Chen Shui-bian briefly stopped in Abu Dhabi and Amsterdam on his way to Paraguay. Chen was denied transit through San Francisco and New York and was only offered stops in Honolulu or Anchorage—locations that were believed to be less provocative to China. Chen ultimately chose to transit through other countries.

Transit Activity

As transits have become more regularized, they have involved more types of activities, especially under President Tsai. During her past transits, Tsai held in-person meetings and spoke on the phone with local and state government officials, some members of Congress, as well as leaders of the American Institute in Taiwan. Taiwan presidents also meet with members of the Taiwan-American community during their transits. 

Prior to the 2023 transit, the highest-ranking U.S. member of Congress Tsai has met in-person during transits was Senator Robert Menendez, who was then ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her most recent transit in July 2019. U.S. protocol and desire to keep Taiwan transits private and unofficial have precluded Tsai from meeting with U.S. executive branch officials during her transits. 

However, Tsai has opted to have phone calls with high-level congressional officials, including then-House Speakers Nancy Pelosi and Paul Ryan. Although no Taiwan president has met a Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on U.S. territory, both Newt Gingrich and Nancy Pelosi have met with Taiwan Presidents in Taiwan. Thus, for Tsai’s upcoming trip, engaging with senior U.S. Congressional leaders is rooted in precedent, and in-person meetings with House Speakers have occurred before. 

In addition to congressional leaders, Tsai and her predecessors have also engaged with current and former U.S. government officials. Tsai called former President Bill Clinton during her June 2016 transit. Her predecessor Chen Shui-bian had called then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage during his transit in 2003. 

Overall, Tsai’s 2023 transit is in line with prior transits in terms of location and matches her prior transit in July 2019 in terms of longest duration. The major difference is her in-person meeting with Speaker McCarthy.

Chinese Actions against Past Transits

It is difficult to predict what actions Beijing will take after Tsai’s 2023 transit, but an examination of past transits provides helpful context. China’s immediate reactions to Taiwan Presidential activities in the United States have varied in severity.³ Three main factors tend to affect China’s behavior: Beijing’s overall perception of political relations within the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, the specific details of the transit (such as timing, duration, and location), and linkages to other major events.

Overall Chinese Perception of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

The most significant factor impacting China’s calculus is the state of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and political dynamics in Washington. This is especially the case when decisions surrounding transits are perceived by Beijing (whether correctly or incorrectly) as changing U.S. policy toward Taiwan or approaching what Beijing views as “official” engagements between the United States and Taiwan. 

Former President Lee Teng-hui’s experience is illustrative of how China could overreact. Lee’s initial attempts at securing a visa for a 1995 visit were rebuffed by the Clinton administration, which had conducted a policy review that concluded Lee should not be allowed to make private visits to the United States. However, Congress intervened and the administration relented. In June 1995, Lee was approved for a “private visit” to the United States with stops in Los Angeles and then Ithaca, New York, to attend a class reunion at his alma mater Cornell University. This was the first time a Taiwan leader had stepped foot in the United States since 1979 (when Washington formally switched official ties from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China). During the trip, Lee had a series of private meetings with local and state officials, and he delivered public remarks at Cornell.  

Beijing interpreted Washington’s move as a major shift in policy and considered Lee’s remarks at Cornell as highly provocative. China strongly publicly and privately protested the visit, cancelled U.S.-China military and high-level exchanges, and recalled China’s ambassador to the United States. Scheduled discussions between U.S. and Chinese leaders on nuclear energy cooperation were also postponed. After the visit, the People’s Liberation Army conducted a series of large-scale military exercises and live-fire drills—including missile tests off the coast of northern Taiwan—starting in late July. Amid building tensions, China continued with additional exercises in March 1996, and the events collectively became known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Since 1995, there have been no additional “private visits” of the United States by Taiwan Presidents—only “transits.”

Overall, China has typically acted more assertively against transits by Taiwan leaders that Beijing perceives as pushing for Taiwan independence. Beijing worries that a successful transit showcases U.S. political and public support of the Taiwan leader. China harbors deep suspicion of Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Democratic Progress Party (DPP) leaders since him, including Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen. This pattern of greater Chinese assertiveness is not unique to transits of the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has demonstrated greater willingness to punish Taiwan and the United States for any perceived “pro-independence” moves or actions and generally views actions by DPP leaders in a negative light. 

In contrast, Beijing has largely turned a blind eye to Taiwan leaders it views as more willing to work with the mainland. For example, China responded mildly, if at all, to Kuomintang (KMT) president Ma Ying-jeou’s transits. As president, Ma engaged with Beijing to develop cross-Strait relations, and his administration improved upon communication and economic cooperation with China. Yet, Ma’s stopovers were still diplomatically significant. During his 2013 stopover in New York, for example, Beijing did not publicly condemn the transit, despite Ma’s several meetings with members of Congress and local officials. 

Format and Activities of Transits

The nature of meetings and events also influence China’s actions. Beijing is more concerned with longer transits than short stopovers. Presidential transits consist of a combination of phone calls, in-person meetings, and public events. China is most wary of meetings with U.S. government officials that could be viewed as official contacts and high-profile public remarks, where Taiwan presidents have the opportunity to address a large audience and influence U.S. and global public opinion.  

Geography matters too. China objected the most when transits are through the continental United States in comparison to when the stops are in Alaska, Hawaii, or Guam. Honolulu was chosen as the inaugural transit location in 1994, highlighting the lower stakes associated with transiting outside of the continental United States. In an effort to limit the profile of one transit by Chen Shui-bian, the Bush administration also denied him transits through San Francisco and New York City, which were seen as a high-profile destination. Instead, Chen was offered a refueling stop in Anchorage, which Chen turned down, choosing to stop in Abu Dhabi and Amsterdam instead.

Tellingly, Chinese officials have publicly and privately indicated that the most provocative location for a transit would be in or near Washington, D.C. A move there would be seen as bringing Taiwan’s leader to the nation’s capital, where official business is typically done. To date, no transits have occurred there.

Linkages to Other Major Events

China’s perception of transits are also shaped by other major geopolitical developments happening around the same time. In July 2019, President Tsai made stopovers in New York and Denver on her way to and from the Caribbean. Two days prior to Tsai’s transit through New York, the U.S. Department of Defense certified the planned sale of a $2.2 billion package of Abrams tanks and Stinger missiles to Taiwan, which made the timing of her stopovers more sensitive and provocative to China.  

China leveraged the full range of diplomatic, economic, and military tools to threaten and punish Taiwan and the United States. On July 31, China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced it would suspend a pilot program that permitted visits to Taiwan for travelers from 47 cities, including the major metropolitan centers of Shanghai and Beijing. On July 12, as Tsai was transiting New York, China threatened sanctions on the U.S. firms that were selling arms to Taiwan. On the military front, from July 28 to August 2, China conducted drills on both ends of the Taiwan Strait, off the coasts of Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces. This was the first time since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that exercises were held in more than one location at the same time. In response, Taiwan deployed two F-16 fighter jets and fired 117 medium and long-range missiles in its own military exercise from July 29 to 30. Ultimately, however, the situation did not escalate to the level of the 1995-1996 crisis.

Initial Chinese Actions against Tsai's 2023 Transit

This section tracks only China's key initial actions while the transit was taking place. For updated analysis on China's overall response following the transit, including large-scale military exercises, visit this ChinaPower feature.

China already began taking action before Tsai’s arrival in the United States, and Beijing has potentially laid the groundwork for substantial actions during or after her transit. The Chinese government has not censored Chinese netizens calling for a strong response to the Tsai transit. Some netizens have suggested a PLA military response even stronger than that of August 2022. Others have highlighted the increased PLA activities to the north, south, and east of Taiwan in the recent couple of weeks. 

In the days leading up to Tsai’s transit China publicly and privately issued strong and stern warnings about the transit. The Chinese foreign ministry labelled Tsai as “the head of Taiwan independence secessionist forces,” claiming that the visit violates the United States’s one-China policy.⁴ Chinese media criticized the Tsai transit as giving “credence to her pro-independence stance,” “bolster[ing] the collusion between the anti-China hawks in Washington and her pro-independence forces,” and allowing for “a kind of official contact” between the United States and Taiwan.  

Additionally, China has been slow to respond to U.S. calls for high-level engagement, including the U.S. desire for President Biden to have a phone call with Xi after China’s Two Sessions. China has yet to send its designated ambassador to the United States to Washington, despite speculation that Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng is likely to be the ambassador and that he was supposed to arrive in Washington in either February or mid-March. However, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi spoke on the phone on Friday, March 24, just days before Tsai was scheduled to begin her transit. In a departure from typical practice, neither side publicized the call and the U.S. and Chinese media did not report on it until Tsai was en route. While details of the conversation have not been revealed, the timing of the call suggests they discussed Tsai’s transit.

Hours before Tsai left Taiwan, Chinese officials ratcheted up rhetoric surrounding the transit. The spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhu Fengliang, firmly stated that, “The so-called ‘transit’ by leaders of the Taiwan authorities is essentially a provocative act of ‘relying on the United States to seek independence.’” In the strongest warning against the expected Tsai-McCarthy meeting in Los Angeles, Zhu warned that such contact, “will be another provocation that seriously violates the one-China principle, harms China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and destroys peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and said China “will take resolute countermeasures.” 

As Tsai arrived in New York, Chargé d'Affaires Xu Xueyuan of the Chinese embassy in Washington warned that regardless of whether it is “Taiwan leaders coming to the United States or the U.S. leaders visiting Taiwan, it could lead to another serious, serious, serious, I repeat, confrontation in the China-U.S. relationship.” She describes the “Taiwan question” as the “first red line that must not be crossed.”  

In terms of actions, China poached another Taiwan diplomatic ally, Honduras. Prior to Tsai’s planned transit, Honduran President Xiomara Castro announced that Honduras would be establishing diplomatic relations with China, leaving only Guatemala and Paraguay as remaining Taiwan partners in Latin America. China reportedly offered Honduras as much as $2.95 billion to establish relations. Shortly after, Honduran foreign minister Eduardo Enrique Reina embarked on a trip to Beijing. This is not the first time China has timed the poaching of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to coincide with a transit through the United States. Two days after Tsai returned from her 2018 transit, China succeeded in getting El Salvador to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. This follows a broader trend of Chinese actions to pressure Taiwan since President Tsai Ing-wen has been in power. Since 2016, China has convinced Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and now Honduras to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China.  

Likely at the encouragement of Beijing, former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou is visiting mainland China from March 27 to April 7. This is a significant move and the first visit to China by a former Taiwan President. His visit begins before Tsai transits the United States and lasts until after she is back to Taiwan, providing Beijing with flexibility to engage with him after seeing the full nature of Tsai’s transit. Ma remains a senior member of the KMT party, the leading opposition party to Tsai’s ruling DPP.  

Additionally, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that on March 31 (Taiwan time), nine PLA aircraft crossed the northern, central, and southern areas of the Taiwan Strait median line in five batches.

Appendix: Details of Tsai Ing-wen’s Past Transits

The section below includes key information for each of Tsai Ing-wen’s six previous transits of the United States, including actions that China took during or immediately (two weeks) prior to or after her transit.

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Matthew Slade

The post Putting Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2023 U.S. Transit in Context appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

Key Takeaways

• China’s 2023 general public budget projects revenue of RMB 23.6 trillion ($3.4 trillion) and sets spending at RMB 27.5 trillion ($4 trillion), resulting in an official deficit of nearly RMB 3.9 trillion ($564.1 billion).
• China’s official 2023 deficit is pegged at about 3 percent of Chinese GDP, but the full deficit—which accounts for other spending areas—is much larger, at around 7.4 percent of GDP.
• New data on China’s 2022 general public budget shows the government brought in less revenue than previously projected, largely due to declining land sales, which are a critical source of income for local governments.
• China’s zero-Covid policies weighed on Chinese coffers. Spending on health and sanitation rose 17.8 percent in 2022—more than twice the growth rate of any other category.

China’s General Public Budget

At the heart of China’s government budget is the general public budget. It includes revenue and spending by the central government and local governments, as well as transfers from the central government to local governments. The newly released budget projects general public budget revenue of RMB 23.6 trillion ($3.4 trillion) in 2023, a 3.5 percent increase from the previous year. Expenditure is set at RMB 27.5 trillion ($4 trillion), a 5.6 percent increase, leaving China with an official projected deficit of nearly RMB 3.9 trillion ($564.1 billion), up 15.1 percent from 2022.¹

The 2023 budget does not include a detailed breakdown of spending across categories at the national level. It only provides a limited breakdown of a handful of categories at the central level, including general public services, foreign affairs, defense, public security, education, science and technology, stockpiling of grains and other materials, and interest on debt payments. These figures only provide part of the full picture since the lion’s share of spending in most of these categories takes place at the local level.

A notable exception to this is the defense budget, since virtually all spending on the military takes place at the central level, not the local level. China’s 2023 defense budget was set at RMB 1.55 trillion ($224.8 billion), a nominal 7.2 percent increase from the 2022 budget of RMB 1.45 trillion ($229.6 billion). This continues a recent trend that has seen nominal yearly percentage increases in the upper single digits.

Even with steady increases, China still spends far less on defense than the United States. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2023 budget rose 9.5 percent in fiscal year 2023, bringing American spending to $797.7 billion. While it lags behind U.S. military spending, China boasts the world’s second largest military budget and continues to widen its lead over other countries. Additionally, it is important to note that China’s official defense figures do not capture total spending on the military. Actual defense spending is estimated to be considerably higher.

China's actual defense spending is hotly debated. Explore our feature to learn about various estimates of Chinese defense spending and how they differ from China's official figures.

Explore More.

In addition to laying out spending figures for 2023, new budget data provides the closest look yet at spending in the 2022 general public budget. The data shows that China’s fiscal situation came under significant pressure amid economic headwinds and the heavy burden of China’s strict zero-Covid policies, which have since been lifted. China’s largest source of government revenue, value-added taxes, dropped by 23.3 percent from the previous year. This stemmed from tax rebates that were put in place to support Chinese businesses in the face of weak domestic spending and sluggish economic growth. Revenue from taxes on property deeds likewise came in 22 percent below 2021 totals, and taxes on land value appreciation dropped 7.9 percent due to a slowdown in China’s property market.²

These declines were partially offset by increases in other categories, including a 20.3 percent increase in revenue from consumption taxes, which are imposed on certain luxury or environmentally-damaging products such as some cars, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages. In all, tax revenue in the general public budget was down 3.5 percent—a decrease of about RMB 612.2 billion ($90.9 billion) from the previous year.

While revenue fell, government spending on health and sanitation surged in 2022 as local governments were forced to pay for Covid-19 testing and other efforts to fight the spread of the virus. Total spending on health and sanitation was up 17.8 percent over the previous year—more than double the rate of increase of any other category. That is also notably higher than the 15.3 percent increase seen in 2020 as China faced the initial outbreak of the virus. China’s increased health spending during the pandemic is mirrored by other countries that took substantial measures to limit the spread of Covid-19. In Australia, which implemented a series of extended lockdowns throughout 2021 and 2022, spending on health goods and services grew by 7.1 percent, which is more than double Australia’s average annual growth rate on health expenditure.

High spending in one area requires making tradeoffs in other areas. Despite Beijing’s concerted efforts to promote developments in science and technology, government spending in this area rose only 3.9 percent in 2022—well below the pre-pandemic average. Some categories even saw spending slashed in 2022. Energy and environmental protection was hardest hit among the categories currently listed, with a 3.2 percent decrease from the previous year. Expenditure on culture, tourism, sports, and media (which are categorized together) also fell by 2 percent, and spending on urban and rural community development dropped 0.2 percent.

The release of detailed 2022 data provides a more complete picture of how China’s government budget has evolved during the decade that Xi Jinping has been China’s leader. Buoyed by China’s rapid economic growth, the general public budget has ballooned significantly since Xi came to power in 2013. From 2013 to 2023, total expenditure grew 93.7 percent and revenue expanded 80.7 percent.

As spending has outpaced revenue each year, China has been left with a widening government deficit. In 2023 the official general public budget deficit is slated to reach RMB 3.88 trillion ($561.2 billion)—the highest level recorded in the general public budget.

Not all parts of the budget have grown at the same pace. Between 2013 and 2022, spending on debt interest payments skyrocketed 271 percent, faster than any other major budget category. The increase reflects the growing strain China is coming under as it grapples with rising debt. China is by no means alone in this. In fiscal year 2022, 7.6 percent of U.S. government outlays were towards interest payments on debt, and 22 percent of Japan’s 2022 budget was spent on dept redemption and interest payments. This number is expected to increase as the Bank of Japan raises long-term interest rates.

China’s spending on social issues has also risen substantially. Expenditure on social security and employment—one of China’s largest spending categories—rose 153 percent between 2013 and 2022. Importantly, however, growth in this category stalled in recent years amid budget constraints imposed by the pandemic. In 2021, spending on social security and employment grew less than 4 percent and in 2022 it grew 8.1 percent—well below the average pace of nearly 13 percent growth in the preceding eight years.

Other categories, such as science and technology and defense, have also experienced high rates of growth over the last decade. Both have been major priorities under Xi Jinping. China’s high spending on science and technology has helped to fuel major national projects such as the Chinese Space Station, the core module of which was initially lofted into orbit in 2021. Spending on defense has also risen at a fast clip amid a major push to modernize the People’s Liberation Army.

Other categories have lagged in comparison. Spending on foreign affairs increased just 37.4 percent over the 2013-2022 period—less than half as fast as spending on defense. Amid belt-tightening during the Covid-19 pandemic, spending on foreign affairs dropped nearly 17 percent in 2020 before dropping further in 2021 and 2022. Notably, however, spending on foreign affairs is set to recover somewhat in 2023 with an increase of over 12 percent.³

At first glance, the budget figures also seem to suggest sluggish growth in spending on transportation, but it is important to note that this does not reflect total spending on infrastructure. China has spent heavily on infrastructure in recent years, in part as a means of spurring economic growth. Much of this spending is obfuscated in various parts of local government budgets. For example, China has issued special sovereign bonds to help local governments fund infrastructure and other projects. Unlike regular government spending, these bonds are earmarked for specific projects and are not reflected in the general public budget.

China's Other Budgets

The general public budget is important, but it only tells part of the story. China has three additional national budgets: the government funds budget, the state capital operations budget, and the social insurance fund budget. In 2014, China’s Budget Law was revised to include a stipulation that revenues and expenditures from all four budgets should be included to create a “full-caliber” budget. Each of these budgets contains different components of China’s fiscal portfolio, as outlined below:

• Government Funds Budget: This budget largely falls under the purview of local governments. Revenue is primarily financed through land sales, with additional revenue from central and local governments purchases of special bonds. Expenditure flows are focused on capital expenditures such as infrastructure projects. In 2023, this budget’s revenue is projected to be RMB 7.82 trillion ($1.13 trillion) and expenditure will be RMB 11.8 trillion ($1.71 trillion), resulting in a deficit of RMB 4 trillion ($578.6 billion).

• State Capital Operations Budget: The state capital operations budget is managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and centers on the revenue and expenditure associated with China’s sprawling network of state-owned enterprises. In 2023, the state capital operations budget is projected to bring in revenue of RMB 535.84 billion ($77.5 billion) and its expenditure will stand at RMB 346.88 billion ($50.2 billion). With an additional RMB 27.5 billion ($4 billion) carried over from the previous year, there will be a resulting surplus of RMB 216.5 billion ($31.3 billion), all of which will be transferred to the general public budget.

• Social Insurance Fund Budget: The social insurance fund is managed by the National Council for Social Security Fund and is dedicated to meeting China’s social security needs. Income is generated from a subset of funds and the bulk of this is spent on costs related to pensions and medical insurance. In 2023, this budget’s revenue is projected to reach RMB 10.94 trillion ($1.58 trillion) and the expenditure will be RMB 9.8 trillion ($1.42 trillion), resulting in a surplus of RMB 1.1 trillion ($159.1 billion), which will be added to the fund’s overall capital.

With the exception of the social insurance budget (which operates somewhat separately), the Chinese government has utilized transfers across these budgets to offset deficits in other areas. This has had the added effect of making it more difficult to analyze China’s fiscal situation.

For example, in 2023, China’s budget report calls for transferring RMB 1.9 trillion ($274.8 billion) into the national general public budget from other budgets and various carryover funds. This includes transfers of RMB 500 billion ($72.3 billion) from the government funds budget and RMB 216.5 billion ($31.3 billion) from the state capital operations budget. This shifting of funds helps to significantly reduce the official deficit of the general public budget. China states that its official general public budget deficit in 2023 will be RMB 3.88 trillion ($561.2 billion), but without transfers from other areas, the actual general budget deficit would total RMB 5.78 trillion ($836.1 billion).

When transfers between budgets are removed and China’s various budgets are consolidated into one total budget (excluding the social insurance fund budget), China’s fiscal situation appears significantly less healthy. China’s official 2023 deficit of RMB 3.88 trillion amounts to approximately 3 percent of China’s GDP. When the other budgets are accounted for, China’s total deficit climbs to 7.4 percent of GDP.

When China’s full budget deficit is tracked over time, it paints a picture of a rapidly worsening fiscal situation for China. In the past, surpluses in the government funds budget and state capital operations budget typically helped to offset deficits in the general public budget, but this changed significantly in 2020 as China spent heavily to offset the economic fallout from the Covid-19 pandemics.

One key part of this has been the issuance of trillions of RMB worth of special purpose bonds. These fall under the government fund budget and were primarily created as a new vehicle for local governments to raise money for infrastructure projects and other special needs. Since 2020, China has authorized the issuance of roughly RMB 3.6 trillion ($520.7 billion) of these bonds each year.

In 2022, China’s fiscal woes were compounded by a major slowdown in the country’s sprawling real estate sector. Land sales are a crucial source of revenue for many local governments. Data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics show that land sales dropped by 53 percent (in terms of area). According to China’s latest budget report, declining land sales led to a 20.6 percent drop in revenue within the government fund budget.

China is not alone in facing a tough fiscal environment. Governments around the world have been challenged by the pandemic and the ensuing economic fallout. Yet China’s situation is worsening at a rapid pace. If its deficits continue to grow, Chinese leaders will be forced to grapple with increasingly tough decisions about how to increase revenue or cut spending—or both.

Authors:
Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Matthew Slade

The post Making Sense of China’s Government Budget appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

November 17, 2022 Debates and Keynote Remarks

9:00 am – 9:05 am: Welcome Remarks

Dr. Bonny Lin
Director, China Power Project and senior fellow, Asian Security, CSIS

9:05 am – 9:35 am: Keynote Remarks

Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA)
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy

9:35 am – 10:50 am: Debate

Proposition: China’s “new normal” of increased military activities in the Taiwan Strait is likely to lead to a US-China or China-Taiwan crisis/conflict in the next year or two

FOR: Mr. John K. Culver
Nonresident senior fellow, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council;
Former senior intelligence officer, Central Intelligence Agency

AGAINST: Dr. Alexander Huang
Chairman and CEO, Council on Strategic & Wargaming Studies;
Special advisor to the chairman and director of International Affairs, Kuomintang (KMT)

10:50 am – 11:00 am: Break

11:00 am – 12:15 pm: Discussion

Proposition: Beijing views a strong China-Russia relationship as a net strategic asset 

Dr. Dave Shullman
Senior director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council
 
Ms. Yun Sun
Senior fellow and co-director, East Asia Program and director, China Program, the Stimson Center

12:15 pm – 12:20 pm: Closing Remarks

Dr. Bonny Lin

January 24, 2023 Debate

Proposition: China can work with the United States to provide cooperative global economic leadership to help the world economy function effectively.

FOR: Dr. Fred Bergsten
Nonresident Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus
Peterson Institute for International Economics

AGAINST: Mr. Daniel Rosen
Partner, Rhodium Group
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS

The post China’s Power: Up for Debate appeared first on ChinaPower Project.

From October 16–22, 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its 20th National Congress to reshuffle the country’s leadership roster and set the political and policy direction going forward. Party congresses, which only take place once every five years, are closely scrutinized for clues into China’s opaque political system. As part of broader personnel shifts, the top brass of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was significantly altered, offering insights into the trends underway within China’s military.

This ChinaPower feature was originally published before the 20th Party Congress with analysis of past personnel changes within the PLA leadership to identify important trends and to forecast changes that could take place at the 20th Party Congress. Following the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress, a new section was added to lay out and analyze key PLA-related outcomes from the party gathering.

Use the links below to skip to sections of the feature:

• Pre-Party Congress Analysis: Trends and Forecasts
• Post-Party Congress Analysis: Outcomes and Key Takeaways

Pre-Party Congress Analysis: Trends and Forecasts

The analysis in this section reflects trends leading up to the 20th Party Congress and has not been changed after the Party Congress. See the following section for analysis of the new Central Military Commission and the outcomes of the Party Congress.

The Central Military Commission

Among the crucial decisions to be made at the party congress are appointments to the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC sits at the helm of the PLA and controls China’s domestic security forces, the People’s Armed Police. It is responsible for overseeing Beijing’s use of military or security forces to advance its national security and foreign policy objectives. Several members of the CMC also sit on leading party organizations such as the National Security Commission and the Foreign Affairs Commission that determine and set China’s national security and external policies.

The CMC is first and foremost a party organization, meaning China’s military reports to the CCP, not the Chinese state. The CCP prioritizes absolute control over the PLA—a reflection of the famous quote by Mao Zedong that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Control over the PLA is so important that former top party leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin chose to retain their Chairmanship of the CMC even after relinquishing other top state and party titles.

In commanding the PLA, the CMC directs a vast bureaucracy. It oversees the headquarters of the main services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—as well as the Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistic Support Force, which were set up as part of Xi Jinping’s 2016 military reforms. The CMC also directs five theater commands (previously seven military regions), which are in charge of operations within their designated areas. Finally, the CMC oversees a suite of subsidiary departments, offices, and other organizations, such as the Joint Staff Department and the Political Work Department.

Click to enlarge.

Xi Jinping became CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC in late 2012, even before he became China’s president in 2013. He is all but guaranteed to remain Chairman after the 20th Party Congress. Below Xi on the CMC are two Vice Chairmen, both of whom sit on the powerful CCP Politburo. The senior Vice Chairman, General Xu Qiliang, rose through the ranks of the PLA Air Force to become its commander before joining the CMC in 2007 and being promoted to Vice Chairman in 2012. General Zhang Youxia hails from the PLA Army and served as Commander of the Shenyang Military Region before being promoted to the CMC in 2012 and becoming its Vice Chairman in 2017.

Rounding out the current CMC are four regular members: General Wei Fenghe, General Li Zuocheng, Admiral Miao Hua, and General Zhang Shengmin. Each of these four members have seats on the CCP Central Committee and concurrently hold important positions within the PLA. General Wei is a State Councilor and Minister of Defense, and General Li is Chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department, which oversees operational planning and command. Admiral Miao is head of the CMC Political Work Department, which directs all party and cultural work within the PLA, and General Zhang is head of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, which oversees anti-corruption investigations.

China’s Central Military Commission before the 20th Party Congress

Scroll to view all members. Use the toggle buttons below to filter by position.

Past Trends in CMC Personnel Changes

This analysis is derived from a biographical database of CMC members compiled by the ChinaPower team. The database is available here.

The CCP leadership has wide discretion over the membership of the CMC. Neither the party nor the state constitutions outline the selection process for the CMC. Events of recent years indicate that Xi has attained substantial influence over the PLA, including the makeup of the CMC. Toward the end of his first term, in late 2015 and early 2016, Xi initiated sweeping reforms of the PLA’s structure which had direct impacts on the CMC and the bureaucracy it oversees. Xi’s influence over the CMC has likely grown with time. Having consolidated considerable political influence during his first term, he was better poised to impose his preferences on CMC appointments during his second term and thereafter.

One of the most notable features of the CMC in recent years is the absence of a civilian senior Vice Chairman position, which was typically filled by China’s leader-in-waiting in the years just before his promotion into the top leadership role. Xi Jinping was CMC Vice Chairman from 2010 to 2012 immediately prior to becoming China’s paramount leader. Hu Jintao was likewise CMC Vice Chairman from 1999 to 2004 before (and after) becoming party and state leader.¹

Under Xi’s leadership, however, no civilian has been named a CMC Vice Chairman. This could suggest the CCP has not tapped a successor to Xi—or, if they have, the party does not want that successor to be known. It also means that Xi Jinping has less diluted influence over the PLA since, unlike his predecessors, he does not have to contend with a successor on the CMC. It is possible a successor to Xi could be appointed as a CMC Vice Chairman during Xi’s third term (2022–2027), but if precedent holds this would happen near the end of his third term, not during the 20th Party Congress that kicks off Xi’s next five years.

The CMC is not just missing a civilian Vice Chairman; the number of military members has also shrunk. In the preceding two decades, the CMC typically included 9 or 10 military members. These members typically spanned a wide range of positions, including heads of several CMC subsidiary organizations and service commanders. By comparison, the current CMC has only 6 military members, with four of these holding a concurrent position as head of a CMC subsidiary organ. As a result, fewer CMC organizations are represented compared to before, and there are no service commanders on the CMC.

The CMC of Xi’s second term also no longer disproportionately comprises members from the Army. Whereas the CMC of the 15^th CCP Central Committee (1997–2002) was entirely made up of members from the Army, the current CMC includes members from each of the four main services, with only two of the six military members coming from the Army. This tracks with a broader effort by Xi Jinping to shift the PLA away from a military dominated by ground forces toward a more joint force with significant air and naval capabilities. As part of this process, Xi announced in 2015 that the PLA would shed some 300,000 personnel, primarily from the Army.

Some of the current CMC members have even served in multiple services, which at face value suggests a more joint-qualified leadership. Admiral Miao Hua spent much of his career in the Army before transitioning to the Navy in 2014. Similarly, General Zhang Shengmin was previously in the Army before transitioning to the Rocket Force. However, both are political track officers who respectively rose through the political commissar system and through the PLA discipline inspection system. Their move from the Army to other services is therefore not an indicator of significant joint experience in terms of operational command. Indeed, the CMC lacks any members with operational experience in the Navy—a situation that could change after the 20th Party Congress.

Furthermore, trends below the CMC level show that the Army is still represented in far greater numbers than other services. The PLA also still lacks high-ranking officers with significant joint experience of the kind that is typical in more joint forces like the U.S. military.

While the current CMC’s membership does not suggest a sprint toward greater jointness across the services, it does show that most of its members have somewhat more diverse experiences than in the past. CMC members are promoted to the CMC only after having served in a theater commander grade (正战区职) position—the highest grade below the grade of CMC member.² This typically includes being a commander or political commissar of a PLA organization that fits into one of three categories: the services, the theater commands (previously military regions), or a subsidiary organization of the CMC.

In the past, CMC members would typically be promoted to the CMC after having experience in just one of these three categories at the theater commander grade. Under Xi, however, the promotion tracks have become more varied. Among the current CMC, four of the six members served in two areas immediately prior to joining the CMC. For example, General Li Zuocheng served as commander of the Chengdu Military Region and then commander of the PLA Army before being promoted to the CMC. Similarly, Admiral Miao Hua was political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region and then political commissar of the Navy before joining the CMC.

This change is not necessarily transformative but may suggest that the Chinese leadership is pushing for top PLA officers to have more significant experience serving at high levels across the military bureaucracy. It also has the added benefit of potentially helping to deter corruption, since moving around reduces the ability of officers to establish a “fiefdom” in which they can dominate.

It is worth noting that, among those CMC members of the last 25 years who previously led theater commands—either as commander or political commissar—some theater commands are more represented than others. Nine CMC members came from the Northern Theater Command (including its Shenyang and Jinan Military Region predecessors).³ This is partly because the two regions were merged to create the new theater commands; however, its constituent military regions were themselves the most frequently represented. This is not all that surprising since the Northern Theater Command is responsible for responding to crises and conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, a major potential geopolitical flashpoint.

What is somewhat surprising is that the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands are not more highly represented. The Eastern Theater Command is responsible for Taiwan and the East China Sea—critical and sensitive areas—yet only three of its leaders have made it to the CMC over the past 25 years. Given growing tensions around Taiwan, it is possible that more leaders of the Eastern Theater Command could make their way onto the CMC in the coming years. Similarly, the Southern Theater Command has only sent two leaders to the CMC despite the South China Sea’s importance for Beijing. It too could see greater representation on the CMC going forward.

Click to enlarge.

Three things have largely remained unchanged for CMC members. First, thanks to laws governing PLA promotion and retirement, there has not been a notable shift in the age of CMC members in recent decades. Over the past 25 years, CMC members have joined the commission at an average age of about 60, with the youngest joining at the age of 56 and the oldest joining at 65. CMC Vice Chairmen tend to join at slightly younger ages, which reflects the fact that they typically have longer tenures on the CMC, serving as members before becoming Vice Chairmen.  

Second, most CMC members continue to rise to the CMC having served in operational roles rather than political positions. Proportionally, the current CMC contains more political track officers than in the past, but this is due to the shrinking of the CMC rather than an outright increase in the number of political-track members.

Third, the CMC continues to include members who have fought in wars. The PLA has not fought in a large-scale conflict since the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 (and the ensuing border conflicts). As time has gone on, this has meant that fewer and fewer PLA officers have experience in conflict. It is notable, then, that the CMC has bucked this trend. Two of the current CMC members—Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and General Li Zuocheng—have wartime experience, which is generally consistent with past CMC iterations. As these older members phase out, fewer CMC members will have experience in a war.  

Previewing Changes to the CMC at the 20th Party Congress

Armed with these insights, it is possible to forecast some of the potential outcomes of the 20th Party Congress.

First, if the CCP leadership upholds norms around retirement for CMC members, four of the six military members are set to retire. Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang and Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia were both born in 1950, putting them well beyond the usual age for staying in office. Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Chief of the Joint Staff Department Li Zuocheng are both 68, just past the typical retirement age.

If all four retire, precedent would suggest that the other two members, Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin, are well-positioned to become the next Vice Chairmen. Over the past 25 years, all CMC Vice Chairmen (except for one) previously served as a regular CMC member prior to being promoted to Vice Chairman. However, it is perhaps more likely that just one of the two is promoted to Vice Chairman since both hail from political (rather than operational) career tracks. It is possible that one of the other current members—particularly General Wei and General Li since they are just at the cutoff age for retirement—could break retirement age norms to become Vice Chairman. Alternately, a non-CMC member could be catapulted into the position. While the latter outcome would be untraditional, Xi has demonstrated a unique tendency to fast-track many top officers for promotion.

Regardless, it is highly likely that several new members join the CMC after the 20th Party Congress, and they will likely be current members of the 19th Central Committee who have reached the grade of theater command leader. Of the 29 CMC Vice Chairmen and members over the last 25 years, virtually all of them (except one) were on the Central Committee prior to promotion to the CMC. There are currently 16 un-retired members of the PLA on the 19th Central Committee at the theater command leader grade from which the future CMC could draw.⁴

One person who stands out as having a good chance of promotion to the CMC is General Liu Zhenli, who has been Commander of the Army since 2021. He is one of the few members of the Central Committee with experience in combat (in the China-Vietnam border conflicts of the 1980s), and he is only 58 years old, which means he could serve at least two terms on the CMC without breaking retirement age norms.

If the leadership disregards Central Committee membership as a prerequisite for promotion to the CMC, General Lin Xiangyang stands out as a potential candidate. He is the current Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, which played a starring role in the unprecedented August 2022 military exercises around Taiwan. Like General Liu, he is approximately 58 and could therefore have a longer tenure on the CMC.

Broadly speaking, Xi will likely want to ensure that the makeup of the CMC is at least as diverse as the current one. This could include appointing at least one Vice Chairman who is not from the Army and including at least one member each from the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force. There will also likely be a premium on appointing officers with combat experience or extensive operational experience to ensure that the PLA is as battle-ready as possible.

Post-Party Congress Analysis: Outcomes and Key Takeaways

The 20th Party Congress concluded on October 22, and the following day the CCP announced the makeup of the Politburo and its standing committee, as well as the CMC and other key bodies. The personnel changes to the CMC show a willingness to break norms to put key individuals in place and they suggest that the party gave preference to officers with specific experiences. However, the changes also represented a reversal of previous moves toward a more diverse CMC.

In some respects, the new CMC represents significant continuity with the previous CMC. As expected, Xi Jinping remained as CMC Chairman, and no heir-apparent was named a CMC Vice Chairman. The commission also remained the same size, with one Chairman, two Vice Chairmen, and four regular members. Three members from the previous CMC remain. Zhang Youxia broke age norms to be reappointed a Vice Chairman, and at age 72 he is now the oldest official in the entire CCP Politburo. Additionally, Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin remained on the CMC and likely retained their positions as head of the CMC Political Work Department and Discipline Inspection Commission, respectively.

However, three new officers bring significant changes to the CMC. First, He Weidong, the former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, replaced Xu Qiliang to become the second Vice Chairman. The Chinese leadership broke two notable norms in catapulting him to the position of Vice Chairman. Almost all CMC members of the past few decades had a seat on the CCP Central Committee prior to their promotion to the CMC, and almost all CMC Vice Chairmen had experience as a CMC member before promotion to Vice Chair. He Weidong had neither.

He Weidong was likely elevated to Vice Chairman in part because of his specific background. From late 2019 to early 2022, He was the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, making him responsible for much of the PLA’s activities related to Taiwan. Prior to that He was Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command and Commander of the Western Theater Command Army. In that position, He was reportedly involved in China’s response to the China-India border skirmishes that took place on the Doklam Plateau, though available reports are not authoritative and the extent of his involvement is unknown. He also has links to Xi Jinping, having served in a Fujian-based army unit when Xi was Party Secretary of Fujian. Experience in these two important mission sets, coupled with ties to Xi Jinping, made He an appealing pick for Vice Chairman.

Want to learn more about the foreign policy and military dimensions of the 20th Party Congress? Read analysis of Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress by members of the ChinaPower team.

LEARN MORE

The other two new members have distinctive backgrounds as well. Li Shangfu, the former head of the CMC Equipment Development Department, joined the commission and is expected to become the next Minister of National Defense, replacing Wei Fenghe. As head of the Equipment Development Department, Li was sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2018 due to Chinese purchases of advanced Su-35 fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. This promises to significantly complicate future U.S.-China ministerial-level interactions on military and security issues.

Rounding out the new CMC is Liu Zhenli, former Commander of the Army. As our pre-Party Congress analysis forecasted, Liu was promoted to the CMC, likely to replace Li Zuocheng as Chief of the Joint Staff Department. Liu is distinguished in being the only CMC member besides Zhang Youxia to have experience in real combat, having fought in border conflicts with Vietnam in the 1980s. His combat experience is a likely reason he is slated to serve in the important position of Chief of the Joint Staff Department. However, he has never served in a joint position.   

Taken together, the CMC’s new lineup offers several key takeaways. First, it shows a surprising pivot back toward a more Army-dominated CMC. In the previous CMC, all four of the main service branches were represented. Now, four of the six military members are from the Army, with no representation from the Air Force.⁵ On top of this, Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin—the two CMC members who are not from the Army—rose through the ranks as political commissars. They do not have experience in operational command positions.

Second, the CMC appointments suggest an emphasis on operational experience. Zhang Youxia was likely retained despite age norms due to his valuable experience in Vietnam border conflicts as well as experience in the Central and North Theater Command regions. He Weidong has deep experience with Taiwan and also spent time in the Western Theater Command. Amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait as well as a general worsening security environment, the leadership in Beijing likely assessed a crucial need to have two Vice Chairmen with experience across the major theaters of conflict, including a Vice Chairman with extensive experience on Taiwan. However, the dominance of the Army on the CMC is noticeable given that a Taiwan contingency would depend most heavily on PLA air and naval forces—not ground forces.

Third, the new CMC reflects deep experience in the areas of military equipment and defense science and technology. Both Zhang Youxia and Li Shangfu were directors of the Equipment Development Department—positions which gave them direct influence over PLA modernization efforts.⁶

Finally, political ties to Xi Jinping likely played a crucial role in CMC appointments, particularly the two top positions. Zhang Youxia is known to have close personal ties to Xi. He Weidong’s norm-breaking and rapid elevation to one of the highest Chinese military positions will likely make him more dependent on Xi and willing to carry out Xi’s orders. Beyond the two Vice Chairmen, Xi is also known to trust Miao Hua when it comes to handling party affairs within the PLA. In the wake of the 20th Party Congress, the CCP’s new Politburo and its standing committee were heavily dominated by Xi loyalists. It is no surprise that he would seek to shape the CMC in his image as well.

Authors:
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman, Hanyue (Amy) Ouyang

The post How Did the 20th Party Congress Impact China’s Military? appeared first on ChinaPower Project.